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INTRODUCTION

Judges and legal scholars have little tolerance for offenders
who plea an excuse or ask for reductions in sentences using self1
control arguments. There are exceptions: the delusional, who
acts out of an “irresistible impulse,” may be found not guilty by
reason of insanity; the jealous spouse, “reasonably” provoked to
murder while “in the heat of passion,” may have the charge
2
reduced to involuntary manslaughter. This general skepticism of
“weakness of will” arguments is not shared by criminologists,
who have produced a large empirical literature showing that low
3
4
self-control is a principal predictor of criminal misconduct.
1. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587,
1599–1602 (1994) (arguing against giving too much weight to claims of impulsivity and
loss of control in context of criminal excuses); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1568 (1998) (arguing that the
criminal justice system should not be designed on the “assumption that the population of
potential criminals is dominated by hyperbolic discounters” with self-control problems);
see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.VII (350 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729, 1818
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 2nd prtg. 1985) (1984) (drawing a distinction between the more
morally reprehensible weak-willed incontinent, who “after deliberating fail, owing to their
passion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation,” and the more morally
forgivable impetuous incontinent—“keen and excitable people” who “because of the
violence of their passions do not wait on reason”).
2. See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866–67 (Ala. 1887) (stating that an irresistible
impulse requires that an offender has “lost the power to choose between the right and
wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time
destroyed” (emphasis omitted)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001)
(explaining that criminal homicide will be downgraded to manslaughter when it “is
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse”). See generally Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272–75
(1996) (discussing ways that emotions are treated in the criminal law); George
Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272–73 (1996) (describing how hot psychological states can
highjack a person’s ability to effectively deliberate and make rational choices).
3. As a general matter, “[s]elf-control problems arise from impulsive behavior” and
occur when we “find ourselves making tempting choices against our own better judgment
and self-interest.” Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase
Quantities of Virtue and Vice, 17 MARKETING SCI. 317, 318 (1998).
4. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
232 (1990) (arguing that self-control problems are, “for all intents and purposes, the
individual-level cause of crime”); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, The Empirical
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Criminologists posit that offenders with low self-control will often
commit crimes while in the pursuit of “short-term, immediate
pleasure,”5 ignoring the consequences of their actions on their
6
future well-being.
A growing empirical literature in economics suggests that
people become increasingly impatient the closer that they get to
an immediate payoff. Time-inconsistent preferences, or
7
“hyperbolic discounting,” can lead people to experience “internal”
intertemporal conflicts: they make repeated short-term decisions
to yield to the transient lure of immediate gratification,
8
notwithstanding their long-term preference to be patient. These
hyperbolic actors exhibit self-control problems, as they “would
‘like’ to behave in one manner, but instead ‘choose’ to behave in
9
another.” How often they end up overriding the wishes of their
long-run selves will depend on their awareness of their future
willpower. Those who are sufficiently aware will take
prophylactic action by adopting commitment devices to properly
guide their own future behavior; those who are overly optimistic
of the resoluteness of their future selves will incur welfare losses
each time that they override their long-term preferences.
This Article examines the effect of time-inconsistent
10
preferences on the decisionmaking process of criminal offenders.
The idealized rational offenders of the standard law and
economics (or neoclassical) approach have time-consistent
preferences: the preference of their long-run and short-run selves
Status of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 38
CRIMINOLOGY 931, 951–53 (2000) (undertaking a meta-analysis and review of empirical
literature on self-control theory and finding that the principal predictor of difference
between offenders and nonoffenders is their level of awareness of future consequences of
their misconduct); James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359,
372–74 (1992) (discussing the role of self-control problems of criminal activity).
5. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 4, at 93; see also JAMES Q. WILSON &
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 194–96 (1985) (discussing the role
of offender impulsivity in the decision to violate the law).
6. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 4, at 89 (declaring that low self-control
offenders have a “‘here and now’ orientation,” unlike high self-control individuals who are
more forward-looking and willing to defer gratification).
7. See Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbolic Discounting and
Consumption, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS, EIGHTH WORLD CONGRESS 258 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003)
(describing hyperbolic discount functions and time-inconsistent preferences).
8. See infra Part III.C (describing evidence on time-inconsistent preferences and
effects on overconsumption and procrastination).
9. Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, The Economics of Immediate Gratification,
13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 233, 233 (2000).
10. The term “present-biased preferences” was coined in an earlier article
examining self-control problems. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or
Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 106 n.7 (1999).
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will always coincide.11 A neoclassical offender and a hyperbolic
offender will both have a long-term preference to violate the law
if and only if the benefits are greater than the expected
sanctions, which I will refer to as “worthwhile” crimes. When a
neoclassical offender has the opportunity to commit a crime she
will not give any added weight to the immediate benefits that the
crime would bring. As a result, a neoclassical offender will never
override her long-term preference merely because she has
become more impatient. However, this Article shows that even a
relatively small preference for immediate gratification and
overoptimism about their future self-control can lead hyperbolic
criminals to repeatedly commit “nonworthwhile” crimes—those
crimes that from a long-term perspective have negative expected
returns. This phenomenon of time-inconsistent misconduct is
foreclosed by the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory,
but is one with important implications for questions of optimal
deterrence and the problem of repeated criminal misconduct.
We can generally say that a person “overconsumes” a
product or good whenever the transient, short-term pull of
immediate gratification leads that person to override their more
detached, nondistorted, long-term preference not to purchase,
use, or otherwise consume the good. Therefore, the Article’s
principal argument is that the prospect of grabbing the
immediate rewards from misconduct can lead a hyperbolic
offender to consciously “overconsume” (commit) nonworthwhile
crimes, in the same manner that she may be tempted to
overconsume in other areas of her life, for example, food,
12
cigarettes, leisure, income, and illicit affairs.
In fact, in recent years, economists have found that relaxing
the time-consistent assumption of neoclassical economics allows
for more intuitive, less strained explanations of such matters as
why people undersave for retirement, rack up large credit card
balances, become addicted to drugs and cigarettes, and
procrastinate leaving the unemployment and welfare rolls. Given
the criminology findings on the self-control problems of criminals,
there is no reason to believe that a person’s decision to violate the

11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219–20 (6th ed. 2003)
(asserting that individuals commit crimes when the expected benefits exceed expected
costs).
12. In fact, the criminology literature on self-control makes important use of the
fact that criminals who exhibit low self-control in their criminal activity also have similar
problems in other areas of their lives in which they can grab immediate benefits. See
GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 4, at 89–91 (observing that people lacking selfcontrol often “have unstable marriages, friendships, and job profiles” as well as displaying
a high rate of smoking, alcohol use, and involvement in accidents).
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law is exempt from the same underlying dynamics. In short, the
time-inconsistent misconduct theory I develop can help explain
why many criminal offenders engage in what, to criminologists
and lay observers alike, appears as irrational, self-destructive
13
behavior.
This Article has two principal objectives. The first is to
develop a theory that isolates four factors that will affect whether
offenders engage in repeated time-inconsistent misconduct: (1) an
offender’s level of present-bias; (2) her awareness of the true
magnitude of her future resoluteness or willpower to keep to her
long-term preferences; (3) the availability of cost-effective
“commitment devices” to help offenders overcome the pull of
immediate gratification; and (4) the extent to which criminal
sanctions and enforcement efforts directly target the short-term,
time-inconsistent preferences of offenders. In the end, any theory
has to be open to empirical testing; identifying these four factors
will help in this endeavor.
This Article’s second objective is to identify various
mechanisms available to policymakers to efficiently deter
repeated time-inconsistent misconduct. The key insight is that a
hyperbolic offender will be underdeterred—will make short-term
decisions to commit nonworthwhile crimes—whenever the
immediate benefits from misconduct (with the added weight due
to the offender’s present-bias) are less than the delayed criminal
sanctions. It thus follows that one way to deter time-inconsistent
misconduct is through enforcement policies that directly reduce
the immediate benefits (or increase the immediate costs) of
criminal activity. Alternatively, criminal sanctions have to be set
high enough to overcome the added weight that a hyperbolic
offender gives to immediate benefits. One of the contributions of
this Article is showing that, all other things being equal, the
optimal sanctions of the neoclassical approach will underdeter
hyperbolic offenders. The Article also suggests a series of less
obvious policy approaches to time-inconsistent misconduct, such
as providing offenders with “off-the-rack” commitment devices.
Finally, the theory also helps explain various puzzles of
neoclassical deterrence theory—for example, why policymakers
punish repeat offenders more harshly and increase enforcement
expenditures before resorting to increasing sanctions to the
maximum extent feasible, as well as why, in some areas, people
violate the law much less frequently than predicted by
neoclassical models.
13. See id. at 89–90 (describing long-term and short-term self-harm by offenders
with low self-control).
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Part II of this Article describes the relevant features of
neoclassical deterrence theory and several empirical puzzles that
follow. Part III develops the concept of time-inconsistent
misconduct. Among other things, it shows that even small levels
of present-bias can lead to repeated nonworthwhile misconduct.
Part IV revisits the neoclassical puzzles. In doing so, it shows
that the optimal sanctions prescribed by neoclassical theory will
necessarily underdeter hyperbolic offenders and that, in choosing
the optimal sanctions for such offenders, lawmakers must target
these offenders’ short-term preference for immediate
gratification. Part V describes various criminal law implications
of the time-inconsistent misconduct theory, including describing
how the theory helps explain criminal law rules dealing with
conspiracies, entrapment, and domestic violence. Part VI
provides conclusions.
II. THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT
The dominant theory of criminal behavior and deterrence, at
least among policymakers and a large number of legal
commentators, is based on the principles of punishment proposed
by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth
14
century. Bentham’s basic insights were formalized by economist
Gary Becker in his seminal article, Crime and Punishment: An
15
Economic Approach, and further elaborated by law and
16
This section describes the general
economics scholars.
assumptions and conclusions of the law and economics approach.

14. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158–59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
Bentham, in turn, was influenced by the earlier work of Cesare Beccaria. See id. at 166
(citing to Beccaria when discussing gravity of punishments).
15. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 191–95 (1968) (incorporating Bentham’s ideas into a discussion regarding the
optimal amount of criminal sanctions).
16. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 4 (recognizing Becker’s work as a
fundamental aspect of applying economic reasoning to a broad range of legal questions);
Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 267, 267–69
(1997) (acknowledging Becker in discussion of the optimal law enforcement model);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1194
(1985) (arguing that Becker’s theory can be extended to various areas of substantive
criminal law).
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A. The Rational Choice Assumption
17

The neoclassical model assumes that offenders are rational,
value-maximizing actors who choose to violate the law if and only
if the benefits from the crime are greater than the expected
18
costs. Because offenders know that they may escape detection,
they make their cost-benefit analyses using expected sanctions,
which they calculate by multiplying the gross sanctions by the
probability that they will be caught and punished. For example,
if the monetary fine for speeding is $200, and a person believes
19
that the probability that she will be caught is 10%, the expected
fine is $20.
Violating the law can provide an offender with both
20
monetary and intangible benefits, and will expose her to formal
and informal sanctions—not only fines and imprisonment but
21
also shaming, ostracism, and loss of reputation. In addition to
these delayed sanctions, there are a series of more immediate
costs of criminal activity, such as the effort and time to prepare
22
for, execute, and cover up a crime. The neoclassical approach
23
focuses almost exclusively on fines and imprisonment. However,
as we will see, the immediate costs of engaging in misconduct can

17. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 219–20 (stating that the economic approach to
deterrence assumes that offenders are rational actors). For a discussion of some of the
general limitations of the rational choice approach in the context of venture capitalists,
see Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A
Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 45, 128–30 (2002).
18. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 47 (2000) (suggesting that a person will violate
the law if and only if the expected utility from doing so, taking into account the expected
benefits and sanctions, exceeds the utility that she would get from obeying the law).
19. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 503–04
(2004) (noting that, for deterrence purposes, an offender’s belief of the probability of
detection is more important than the actual probability).
20. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 219 (stating that the benefits from criminal
misconduct include “various tangible (in the case of crimes of pecuniary gain) or
intangible (in the case of so-called crimes of passion) satisfactions from the criminal act”).
Because there is always a chance that the benefits will not materialize, offenders will
discount the gross benefits from violating the law to account for this risk. See Wilson &
Abrahamse, supra note 4, at 367–68, 375 (finding that criminals consistently miscalculate
the net expected benefits of committing crimes). Throughout the Article I refer to
“benefits” instead of expected benefits because my primary concern is with immediate
benefits.
21. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 637–47 (1996) (discussing the role of shaming in deterring criminal behavior
and effecting other potential goals of punishment).
22. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331,
1352–60 (2006) (discussing empirical evidence on avoidance costs incurred by offenders).
23. See, e.g., id. at 1348–50 (arguing that the neoclassical approach has paid little
attention to avoidance costs).
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play an important role in a hyperbolic offender’s decision-making
process.
B. Choosing Socially Optimal Criminal Sanctions
All punishment theories provide some account of why society
should punish offenders and prescriptions for choosing the type
and magnitude of criminal sanctions. The neoclassical approach
posits that the sole aim of punishment is to maximize social
welfare. In order to accomplish this, policymakers would, at least
24
in theory, follow the following four steps.
First, they would identify harmful activities to be outlawed
and the level of harm produced. The general aim is to deter
offenders from engaging in behavior that produces greater social
harm than benefits, not necessarily to foreclose all criminal
activity. Some crimes, like murder, rape, and armed robbery,
require total deterrence because they produce harm that is so
serious in nature that it trumps any plausible legitimate benefits
25
to criminals. However, there are a series of less harmful
offenses, including regulatory crimes that, while serious, do not
necessarily call for total deterrence—at least not from an
26
economic standpoint.
Second, policymakers would choose the actual magnitude of
the sanctions. When crimes call for total deterrence, penalties
can be set at a level that greatly exceeds the benefits that
offenders would hope to receive, given that there is no danger of
overdeterring offenders. In all other cases, policymakers would
set the expected sanctions equal to the expected harm of the
illegal behavior. This would assure the correct economic result
because, by assumption, rational offenders violate the law only
when the benefits from misconduct exceed expected sanctions,
and thus setting sanctions equal to the expected harm
guarantees that offenders will fully internalize the costs of their
actions. This means that, in theory, offenders will commit crimes

24. See Becker, supra note 15, at 181–85 (describing the goal of minimizing the
social costs of crimes).
25. In order to affect complete deterrence, these crimes require the maximal
sanction. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 1196-97, 1215-16 (discussing criminal activity,
much falling under the rubric of common law crimes, that society has determined calls for
total deterrence).
26. In fact, the law and economics approach to criminal sanctions is based on the
same general principles used to determine the optimal damages for torts, where the goal
is to provide actors with the right incentives when choosing their activities and level of
care, rather than completely dissuading them from engaging in those activities. See
SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 474–79 (discussing analogous strict liability and fault-based
rules in tort and criminal law contexts).
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only when their actions produce a net gain for society; that is,
only when their net expected benefits (after taking the expected
sanctions into account) are at least as great as the social harm.27
For example, if discharging pollutants into a stream produces a
harm equal to $1,000, and there is a 50% probability that an
offender will be detected and punished, then the optimal fine is
28
$2,000. This will assure that the expected sanctions and harm
both equal $1,000, and that a utility-maximizing offender will
pollute if and only if the benefits she receives exceed the harm
29
produced.
Third, policymakers would need to determine how to punish
offenders. As mentioned above, the neoclassical approach focuses
30
on fines and imprisonment. However, the general insights of the
approach can be extended to other types of nonmonetary
31
sanctions. As a general matter, fines, which are essentially a
transfer of wealth from offenders to society, have lower
administrative costs and deadweight losses. Crimes punished by
imprisonment require greater procedural protections, and thus
expenditures, during trial and impose ongoing administrative
costs of running prisons. Imprisonment creates other deadweight
losses by keeping inmates from being economically productive
and, if the prison term is sufficiently long, diminishing valuable
human capital that inmates could use for employment after
32
parole. As a result, all other things being equal, the neoclassical
approach prescribes that policymakers should resort to prison
33
sentences only if the targeted offenders would be unable to pay
the optimal fines.
27. See Becker, supra note 15, at 181–85 (calculating aggregate welfare by taking
into account the benefits offenders receive from their criminal activity).
28. As a general matter, suppose that an offense produces a harm, h, and the
probability of detection is p. When the sanction, s, is discounted by p—p ∗ s—and if we
set p ∗ s = h, then the optimal sanction is reached by multiplying the harm by the
probability multiplier 1/p. Therefore, the optimal sanction is h/p.
29. If polluting would yield a benefit of $1,500, the company will pollute and face
the expected fine of $1,000. If the company is detected, it will have to pay the $2,000 fine,
but as there is only a 50% chance of this, the expected net benefit is $500.
30. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and
Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 89–90 (1984) (discussing various ways of trading off
monetary fines and prison terms).
31. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 47 n.6 (stating that their economic
analysis of jail terms carries over to other sanctions such as probation, electronic
monitoring, and community service).
32. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 223 (arguing that imprisonment causes a
depreciation of skills and a loss of contacts that impairs a convict’s productivity postparole and thus causes depreciation in the convict’s human capital).
33. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 51 (stating that sanctions via fines
should be exhausted first before using prison sanctions because fines are wealth transfers
and are generally cheaper to collect than the social costs of imprisonment); see also
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Fourth, because expected sanctions are a function of both the
gross penalty and the probability of detection, policymakers
would choose how much to spend to detect criminal activity and
34
apprehend offenders. Because the normative goal of neoclassical
theory is to minimize the social costs of criminal deterrence,
policymakers would expend resources to increase the probability
of detection only if the same level of deterrence cannot be
achieved more cheaply by increasing the magnitude of the gross
sanctions. It follows that they would invest in enforcement only if
wealth-constrained offenders are unable to pay the optimal fine,
or if preventing crimes from occurring is more cost-effective than
35
using prison sentences after the fact.
In conclusion, the neoclassical approach prescribes that
policymakers should identify the type and magnitude of harm
that they want to deter. Next, they would set the expected
sanctions equal to the expected harm and, in doing so, will choose
the type of sanction. Finally, policymakers would determine how
much of the desired deterrence will be affected through the gross
penalty and how much through enforcement measures aimed at
increasing the probability that offenders will be caught and
punished.
C. Some Puzzles and Problems of the Neoclassical Approach
Proponents of the neoclassical approach assert that they are
providing a positive account of the way criminals and
policymakers actually behave, not just a normative framework
SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 482 (discussing underdeterrence when offenders do not have
sufficient levels of wealth to pay fines necessary to properly deter them).
34. Not all increases in enforcement costs will provide a sufficiently high return in
reducing the harm from misconduct; thus, to economize these costs, society will
sometimes opt for underdeterrence. If there is underdeterrence, then it does not follow
that when a criminal is observed in misconduct, social welfare is increased. See SHAVELL,
supra note 19, at 488–89 (arguing if there is underdeterrence, the fact that someone
engaged in misconduct does not signal that her expected benefit exceeds the expected
harm).
35. If the expected harm of an offense is $1,000 and offenders can afford up to a
$100,000 fine, the probability of detection should be 1% and the actual fine $100,000.
Assuming that the administrative costs of fines do not increase with the level of the fine
(which will not always be the case because offenders facing higher fines may attempt to
hide assets), any investment in enforcement that increases the probability of detection
above 1% would be wasteful. This was one of the important insights in Gary Becker’s
work on optimal criminal deterrence. See Becker, supra note 15, at 190–93 (describing the
trade-off between the magnitude of sanctions and enforcement expenditures to increase
probability of detection); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal
Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of
Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, (1992) (describing the optimal trade-off between
higher sanctions and enforcement costs when offenders are imperfectly informed of
probability of detection).
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and policy prescriptions. This section describes a number of wellknown puzzles (or problems, depending on the normative lens
employed) with the positive claims of neoclassical theory, and
sets forth some additional empirical wrinkles and explanatory
“gaps.” As we will see, beginning in Part III, these puzzles (or
problems) are the result of the time-consistency assumption and
disappear if one allows for hyperbolic offenders.
1. The Puzzle of the Overdeterrence of Serial Offenders.
This Article is primarily concerned with “serial offenders”: those
who commit more than one crime over time, including—although
not exclusively—those who have been previously convicted of a
36
crime. Serial misconduct is a common phenomenon. For
example, a large number of prison inmates are either repeat
37
offenders or have been reincarcerated for parole violations. In
2002, 46% of prison inmates were repeat nonviolent offenders
38
and 41% repeat violent ones. Additionally, many types of crimes
afford offenders with repeated opportunities to violate the law.
For example, employees who embezzle funds often do so
repeatedly and over extended periods. Co-conspirators in
criminal enterprises and members of gangs engage in a variety of
repeated criminal activity over long periods of time. Managers
who falsify financial results usually do so in more than one
reporting period and may over time resort to other fraudulent
transactions to cover up the false disclosure. More generally,
serial misconduct is common in securities, antitrust, and
environmental law, as well as in a number of other regulatory
39
contexts.
As a result, one would expect that any comprehensive theory
of criminal misconduct would account for serial misconduct.
Under the neoclassical approach, the optimal expected sanctions
are solely determined by the harm produced when an offender
violates the law, which (all other things being equal) will be the

36. Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and
Economics of Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2005) (stating that the
standard law and economics approach to repeated misconduct has “long assumed that
whether choices are made repeatedly or on a one-time basis is expected to have little or no
effect on individuals’ decisions”).
37. See, e.g., James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or Bad Policy? An Examination of
Tennessee Release Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 485, 496–98 (2005)
(discussing a Tennessee Department of Correction report that overall return rates for
offenders released to parole increased from 40.5% in 1993 to 48% in 1997).
38. DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, NCJ 201932, PROFILE OF JAIL
INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf.
39. See infra notes 40-43 (discussing penalty schemes for repeated violations in
regulatory context).

(3)UTSET.DOC

2007]

9/12/2007 4:15 PM

HYPERBOLIC CRIMINALS

621

same across offenders and regardless of the number of times the
crime is committed. In other words, a utility-maximizing offender
will commit a crime ten times (or equivalently, ten offenders will
each commit it once) only if, in each instance, the benefits are
greater than the expected sanctions (and thus greater than the
harm produced). Since for the purpose of setting optimal
sanctions all instances of the same crime are identical, the
neoclassical approach does not draw a distinction between the
one-time and serial offender.
Lawmakers, however, do. The law routinely punishes
previously convicted offenders and those who commit more than
one crime before being caught (whether or not previously
40
convicted) with “super-punitive” expected sanctions. In other
words, serial offenders face sanctions that are greater than the
aggregate expected harm created by repeatedly engaging in
41
prohibited activity or delaying compliance with legally-imposed
42
duties. Proponents of the neoclassical approach acknowledge
that super-punitive sanctions will overdeter rational offenders—
43
some socially beneficial misconduct will not occur —and have

40. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides for heightened sanctions
for repeat and career offenders. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2006)
(allowing for the addition of points to criminal history dependent upon the type and
length of prior sentence); id. at § 4B1.1 (2006) (adjusting the offense level for career
offenders). Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, the range of penalties for a
first-time offender are $250 to $2,000; for a second-time offender they are $2,000 to
$5,000; and for a third-time offender they increase to $3,000 to $10,000. Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2000). In addition, a
person who engages in a pattern of violation of the Act can also be subject to a six-month
jail sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1). Environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water
Act and the Clean Air Act, also have provisions for escalating criminal penalties for
repeat offenders. Under the Clean Water Act, the available penalties are doubled after a
first conviction. Water Quality Act of 1987 § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), (2) (2000) (stating
that negligent violators face a maximum of $25,000 per day and a one year jail sentence,
knowing violators face maximum of $50,000 per day and three year jail sentence for first
conviction and providing that the sanctions for second offenses in each can be doubled);
see also Clean Air Act § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2000) (allowing maximum sanctions
for second offense to be double those for first offenses).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir.
2002) (affirming sentence enhancement for defendant’s violation of Clean Water Act for
repeatedly washing asbestos down drain that discharged into bay); United States v.
Liebman, 40 F.3d 544, 549–51 (2d Cir. 1994) (agreeing that a sentence can be enhanced
for “ongoing and repetitive discharge” of a hazardous substance).
42. See, e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987 § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2004) (stating
that each one-day delay in complying with the agency’s order is an act of misconduct,
triggering daily fines between $5,000 and $50,000, regardless of the connection between
the ongoing delay and the harm caused by the violation being remedied).
43. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of
Deterrence, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 307 (1998) (admitting that escalating sanctions
may overdeter some criminal behavior). A similar argument holds for the use of punitive
damages in tort. See Punitive Damages, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
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offered various possible explanations for the continued use of
escalating sanctions.44 However, they have not reached any real
consensus as to why lawmakers systematically violate such a
core neoclassical principle, and at least one commentator has
argued that under neoclassical assumptions, aggregate sanctions
for repeat offenders should in fact be lower than the aggregate
45
harm.
2. The Puzzle of Systematic Underdeterrence. One plausible
explanation for why serial offenders are punished with superpunitive damages is that lawmakers believe that existing
criminal sanctions are not having the desired deterrence effect.
Some offenders, the argument would go, are simply not reacting
46
to sanctions in the manner predicted by neoclassical theory.
One can fairly assume that a lawmaker who concludes that
offenders are being systematically underdeterred will ratchet the
47
sanctions up until the deterrence gap is closed.
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 193 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan Ref. Ltd. 1998) (“[I]f
damages are less than harm, levels of activity will tend to be socially excessive, and if
damages exceed harm, levels of activity will tend to be low.”).
44. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 228–29 (noting several reasons why higher
sanctions make sense, including to offset the reduced stigma effect from a second
conviction and to counteract the learning-by-doing of repeat offenders); C.Y. Cyrus Chu,
Sheng-Cheng Hu & Ting-Yuan Huang, Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 130–31 (2000) (arguing that because the risk of an erroneous
conviction is greater for a first conviction, the penalty for a first conviction is set lower
than the expected harm); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 43, at 308–09 (arguing that
punishing repeat offenders more severely increases the level of deterrence because a firsttime offender will take into account the expected sanctions for both the first and second
offense).
45. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 742 (2001) (arguing that the probability of detection
increases with prior convictions because convicted offenders leave a paper trail in system;
therefore, optimal sanctions should be lower for previously convicted offenders).
46. A number of criminal law scholars have persuasively argued that in practice,
this approach has led to repeated increases of criminal sanctions without achieving the
deterrence lawmakers desired. See, e.g., John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of
Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189,
193–95 (2005) (describing the problem of underdeterrence notwithstanding everincreasing prison sentences).
47. There are two reasons why policymakers may intentionally adopt sanctions that
underdeter offenders. The first reason is that risk averse offenders will be overdeterred by
the optimal sanctions for risk neutral offenders. Risk averse offenders would prefer lower
actual sanctions and a higher probability of being caught, given that if they are caught,
the extra disutility to them from the higher sanctions is a deadweight loss. For example, if
the actual fine is $100,000, a risk averse person who is caught will perceive a loss greater
than $100,000, but society will only get the $100,000 fine. As a result, policymakers who
believe that the population is comprised of more risk averse than risk neutral individuals
will adopt lower sanctions. Second, policymakers may want to adopt expected sanctions
that are slightly lower than the expected harm, up to the point that the savings in
enforcement costs are greater than the marginal harm that is not deterred. See SHAVELL,
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One
neoclassical
explanation
for
this
perceived
underdeterrence is that, as mentioned above, offenders who are
financially unable to pay the optimal fine will be underdeterred;
such offenders are, in essence, “judgment-proof.” However, the
question remains why those offenders would also be
48
The perception by
underdeterred by prison sentences.
lawmakers that some offenders are not just judgment-proof but
also “prison-proof” is what has led states to adopt three-strikes
laws. The Supreme Court recognized as much when it refused to
strike down California’s three-strikes law in Ewing v. California,
explaining that California’s legislature made a “deliberate policy
choice that individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious
or violent criminal behavior, and whose conduct has not been
deterred by more conventional approaches to punishment, must
49
be isolated from society in order to protect the public safety.”
The emergence of three-strikes laws is not the only
indication that many lawmakers believe that there is a
deterrence gap. Since the early 1970s, the average prison
50
sentence in the United States nearly tripled in length, and the
number of inmates in prison increased from 216,000 to over
51
2,000,000. Even taking into account population growth, we are
currently incarcerating about four times as many offenders as in
52
1970. Given present rates of incarceration, of all the individuals
born in 1991 and 2001, approximately 5.2% and 6.6%,
53
respectively will serve time in prison.
Moreover, in the last twenty years, lawmakers have
repeatedly ratcheted up both fines and prison sentences for white
collar criminals, in a number of instances triggered by corporate
54
“scandals” —a word that, by definition, implies that lawmakers
supra note 19, at 484–85 (illustrating the relationship between a low probability and high
magnitude sanction policy).
48. Id. at 495 (noting that an actor whose benefit exceeds the maximum
imprisonment time will not be deterred).
49. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003).
50. Darley, supra note 46, at 190.
51. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf (listing the number of individuals incarcerated in 1974 as
216,000); PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2005 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf
(listing the number of individuals incarcerated in 2005 as 2,320,359).
52. Darley, supra note 46, at 190.
53. BONCZAR, supra note 51, at 1.
54. Enacted in the wake of Enron and Worldcom, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides
for enhanced criminal penalties for white-collar offenders. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 807, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1348)
(detailing corporate and criminal fraud accountability); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
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and the public were “surprised” by the ineffectiveness of existing
sanctions.55 This sense of surprise is captured by Alan
Greenspan’s post-Enron “infectious greed” testimony before
Congress:
Why did corporate governance checks and balances that
served us reasonably well in the past break down? . . . An
infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business
community. Our historical guardians of financial
information were overwhelmed. . . . It is not that humans
have become any more greedy than in generations past. It
is [that] the avenues to express greed had grown so
56
enormously.
Under neoclassical theory, an offender may also be
underdeterred if she was somehow mistaken about the true
magnitude of the gross sanctions or the probability of detection.
This explanation has three shortcomings. First, most of the
perceived underdeterrence involves repeat offenders, the very
type of offender who is least likely to make systematic mistakes
of this type, given that each conviction provides her with
information about the expected sanctions. Second, it does not
explain why these mistaken beliefs will necessarily lead to
systematic underdeterrence. In other words, it is just as likely
that offenders will be mistaken in the opposite direction and be
overdeterred. Third, even if one assumed that offenders were
underdeterred, it does not explain why policymakers would
L. No. 107-205, §§ 902–905, 116 Stat. 745, 804 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349,
and 29 U.S.C. § 1131) (providing penalty enhancements for white collar crime); SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-205, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff) (providing penalties for any person who willfully and knowingly provides false and
misleading statement to the Securities Exchange Commission). This exposes an
additional puzzle of the neoclassical approach: the fact that lawmakers routinely adopt
imprisonment sanctions for offenders, such as white-collar criminals, who have sufficient
disposable wealth to pay optimal fines. See Garoupa, supra note 16, at 271 (explaining
that in the United States, and much less in Europe, policymakers resort to prison
sentences before exhausting fines).
55. See, e.g., 107 CONG. REC. H5470 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statements of Rep.
Crowley) (recognizing that the bill “punishes criminal acts by greedy CEOs,” and “will
ensure the independent auditors of America’s publicly traded corporations are actually
independent”); id. (statements of Rep. Wilson) (observing that “we have had some greedy
people who cooked the books” and concluding that the legislation is necessary “to restore
confidence in the American system of free enterprise”); 107 CONG. REC. H5468 (daily ed.
July 25, 2002) (statements of Rep. Sanders) (propounding that if Congress is “serious
about tackling corporate greed,” they need to go further than Sarbanes-Oxley); 107 CONG.
REC. H5466 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statements of Rep. Kelly) (noting that the bill will
help “mend the bonds which have been abused by the people who have been motivated by
greed”).
56. Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report for 2002: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).

(3)UTSET.DOC

2007]

9/12/2007 4:15 PM

HYPERBOLIC CRIMINALS

625

resort to increasing sanctions instead of providing offenders with
more accurate information.
Some nonneoclassical scholars have tried to explain the
underdeterrence problem by referring to social science evidence
finding that offenders often make decisions without giving any
real (or meaningful) consideration to the magnitude of the
57
punishment that they may face. A variant of this explanation
posits that offenders significantly undervalue long prison
58
sentences because of their extreme myopic outlook —for
example, offenders discount the first year of a prison sentence by
a much larger amount than they discount a year that is added to
59
the end of a long sentence. While this explanation of
underdeterrence is no doubt accurate for some offenders, it relies
on rather extreme discounting between an offender’s short-term
60
and long-term well-being. Moreover, it is a type of impatience
that can be captured using standard long-term discounting if one
61
allows for very high discount rates. Finally, this explanation
fails to account for the fact that some offenders, as we will now
see, are in fact overdeterred.
3. The Overenforcement and Overdeterrence Puzzles. There
are two more related problems with the neoclassical approach.
The first is that policymakers spend much more on enforcement
62
than the theory predicts. A neoclassical policymaker who wants
57. See Darley, supra note 46, at 195–201 (setting forth reasons why offenders fail
to give full weight to the prospect of future punishment, including disordered
personalities, influence of drugs or alcohol, peer pressure, and lack of knowledge about
the probability of detection or the magnitude of the punishment).
58. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2505–06 (2004) (discussing how higher discount rates can lead more myopic
offenders to bargain harder at the time of plea bargaining); Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1538–40 (1998) (describing myopia of offenders and consequences for
deterrence policy); Posner, supra note 1, at 1567–68 (acknowledging that it is likely that
many offenders are myopic discounters and describing the effect of long-term prison
sentences).
59. This type of myopic discounting is different from the time-consistent discounting
used in standard rational choice theories—an additional year in prison should carry the
same weight, regardless of whether it is the first year or comes after the tenth. See
Posner, supra note 16, at 1213–14 (discussing standard economic exponential discounting
in the context of long prison sentences).
60. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Incentives and Self-Control 9 (Dec.
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Houston Law Review) (arguing that
hyperbolic discounting is “not a theory of long-term impatience” but one whose important
feature is that it permits “the study of immediate gratification without assuming insane
myopia”).
61. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1555 (arguing that decisions of hyperbolic offenders
of this type can be analyzed under a standard rational choice model).
62. See Garoupa, supra note 16, at 271 (stating that policymakers resort to prison
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to increase the expected sanction of a crime by one (deterrence)
unit can do so by increasing the magnitude of a fine or prison
term, or, alternatively, by spending more on enforcement in order
to increase the probability of detecting offenders. The goal is to
produce the additional deterrence unit at the lowest cost possible.
This means that, as a general matter, the policymaker should
first increase fines, then prison terms, and only as a last resort
spend more on enforcement. Since imprisonment creates a series
of deadweight costs, it will not always be the case that increasing
prison sentences will be more economical than increasing the
probability of detection. Nonetheless, spending money on
enforcement is an ongoing expenditure, while the costs of
imprisonment will only be triggered when an offender is caught
and punished. This means that in many instances increasing
prison sentences will create a smaller social cost than the
enforcement option. All this notwithstanding, in reality
policymakers routinely resort to greater enforcement
expenditures before they have exhausted these other options.
Under the neoclassical approach, an offender will violate the
law whenever the benefits exceed the expected sanctions.
However, in some areas, such as tax compliance, people obey the
law much more often than predicted by the theory—in short, they
63
are overdeterred. When this phenomenon is combined with the
underdeterrence problem described above, it seems that the more
general problem is that people sometimes underreact and other
times overreact to criminal penalties.
As we will see in the remainder of the Article, the timeinconsistent misconduct theory provides a more intuitive
explanation for this miscalibration between penalties and the
behavior of offenders and thus for the various puzzles of the
neoclassical approach described in this section.
III. A MODEL OF REPEATED TIME-INCONSISTENT MISCONDUCT
This Part begins by describing the intertemporal
characteristics of all decisions to violate the law, as well as those
that attach to serial misconduct in particular. The first section
ends by developing the concept of intertemporally worthwhile
misconduct. The second section defends the assumption that
hyperbolic offenders have a long-term preference to act in a timesentences before exhausting fines); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 51 (arguing that
fines should be exhausted before resorting to prison sentences because fines are socially
costless).
63. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 72 (noting that given the penalties for
tax avoidance, one would expect a greater level of underpayment).
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consistent manner and not yield to immediate gratification, and
the third describes the empirical evidence on time-inconsistent
preferences. The rest of Part III develops the time-inconsistent
misconduct model. First it provides a formal account of
exponential and hyperbolic discounting. Next it develops the
concept of time-inconsistent misconduct and contrasts the
model’s predictions with those of neoclassical theory. After that,
it discusses the welfare losses from time-inconsistent misconduct,
and then extends the model to serial misconduct. The Part
concludes by setting forth various conclusions and addressing
some possible objections.
A. Serial Misconduct and the Intertemporal Nature of Crime
Before continuing, it is necessary to specify in greater detail
the concept of serial misconduct and the decisionmaking process
of serial offenders. I will say that a person engages in serial
misconduct whenever she commits more than one crime over a
chosen time period, which may be as short as a day for a spree
offender or years for the career criminal. Additionally, a serial
offender may commit the same crime repeatedly, or different
ones which, of course, may be connected in various ways. For
example, a bank employee who repeatedly embezzles funds may
also make false disclosures to the bank and regulators, violate
money-laundering laws, and commit perjury when interviewed
by federal investigators. Finally, the serial offender may be a
recidivist or a person whose repeated misconduct is never
detected.
1. Serial Misconduct and Future Well-Being. The first
thing to note about serial misconduct is that each crime a person
64
commits will cast a shadow over her future well-being. As a
result, one would expect that, when deciding whether to embark
on a path of serial misconduct, an offender will try to predict her
future preferences, including giving thought to how she expects
to behave in the future, whether she may come to regret the
decision, and how others will react to her behavior. For example,
when an offender is caught, her past decisions to obey or disobey
the law can affect how others frame and judge her current act of

64. See Deborah Tannen, What’s in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying
Expectations, in FRAMING IN DISCOURSE 14, 20–21 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993)
(explaining that people approach the world “as experienced and sophisticated veterans of
perception who have stored their prior experiences as ‘an organized mass,’ and see events
and objects in the world in relation to each other and in relation to their prior
experience”).
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misconduct65—her state of mind, intent, and knowledge66—and
67
parcel reactive sentiments of resentment or indignation.
Additionally, an offender embarking on a “life of crime” will
compare the value of the knowledge she will acquire in the
process with the increased cost of acquiring or diversifying her
human capital in the future through education or employment.
She will also account for how her decision will affect the social
and personal networks that she develops and whether she will
eventually form friendships and stable family relationships with
noncriminals.
There are other factors that potential serial offenders will
consider, but as can be seen from this brief list, a decision to
68
embark on a path of serial misconduct can be very complex.
This means that serial offenders may not make fully informed
decisions, even if they had all the information at hand, given
well-known cognitive constraints faced by rational actors when
69
making decisions in complex environments. Our concern,
however, is not with systematic departures from rationality

65. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 496–99 (1974) (discussing the role of expectations—“frames”—in dealing
with ambiguities and avoiding misunderstandings); Robert N. Ross, Ellipsis and the
Structure of Expectations, in 1 SAN JOSE STATE OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS 183
(1975) (describing “structure of expectations” used by people to organize knowledge about
the world and process new information, events, and experiences).
66. See Roger C. Crampton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal
and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 147 (2002) (arguing that lawyers should anticipate
hindsight bias when advising clients acting at the margin of legality); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
571, 590–94 (1998) (discussing the role of the hindsight bias in ex post reconstructions of
past behavior).
67. See R. JAY WALLACE, Reason and Responsibility, in NORMATIVITY AND THE WILL:
SELECTED PAPERS ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PRACTICAL REASON, 123, 123–24 (2006)
(describing expectations of behavior in moral communities as reactive sentiments and
judgments). This explains why some commentators who reject the neoclassical approach
argue that repeat offenders should be punished more harshly. See Morse, supra note 1, at
1601 (“[A]n habitually impulsive person may have less ground for an excuse than an
agent suddenly and unpredictably faced with an impulse” given that the latter “knows
that she is especially likely to act thoughtlessly and may therefore be held accountable for
failure to take those steps that might remedy habitual impulsiveness or avoid those
situations that facilitate it.”).
68. As a general matter, complexity is a function of the number of sub-parts of the
system in question and the level of interdependence between them. See generally
HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 195 (2d ed. 1981) (defining a
complex system as “one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple
way” and where “given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is
not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole”).
69. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (stating that people routinely resort to
heuristics when making complex decisions, something that can lead to systematic errors
and departures from complete rationality).
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brought about by the use of decision heuristics by boundedly
rational offenders but those due to their short-term impatience.
Nonetheless, the two are connected in an important way.
Complex decisions will often involve a number of immediate
costs—for example, an offender will have to exert greater effort
when making the decision. As we will see in Part IV, these
immediate costs of misconduct can lead otherwise resolute
hyperbolic offenders to repeatedly procrastinate committing
worthwhile crimes.
2. The Temporal Gap Between the Benefits and Costs of
Crime. When we say that serial misconduct casts a shadow over
an offender’s future well-being, what we mean is that the costs
and benefits from that misconduct are received at different
points in time—or alternatively, that it involves a series of
70
intertemporal choices. More generally, any time that an
offender decides to violate the law, she is making an
intertemporal decision. This is because there is always a
temporal gap between the time the offender commits a crime and
the first possible moment in which she will experience the
disutility from criminal sanctions. This follows from the very
nature of criminal punishment: an offender must first be caught
71
and convicted before she can be punished. Additionally, if the
punishment is in the form of a prison sentence, then even the
punishment itself will have intertemporal features.
On the other hand, in almost all instances, the benefits from
misconduct are received (or the offender expects to receive them)
before the time when she can be punished. Even more
importantly for our purposes, these benefits are usually received
immediately at the time the crime is committed. This holds for
both tangible benefits, such as money and personal property, as
70. An intertemporal decision is one in which the costs and rewards that flow from
the decision are not all incurred or received in the same time period. See George
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.
181, 181 (1989) (defining intertemporal choices as “decisions in which the timing of costs
and benefits are spread out over time”); George F. Loewenstein & Dražen Prelec,
Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 565, 565–67
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing intertemporal choices and
defining temporal sequence).
71. A person may, of course, bear an immediate disutility in shame or anxiety when
her misconduct is detected. However, that disutility will be relatively small when
compared to criminal penalties, so it is unlikely to be sufficiently large to affect any of the
conclusions below. This claim gains some support from the fact that this type of
immediate disutility from getting caught is rarely, if ever, discussed by commentators
concerned with deterring misconduct. Nonetheless, even if one were to allow this
immediate disutility to be large, it does not affect our conclusions as long as the
immediate rewards from misconduct are sufficiently high.
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well as various types of intangible utility.72 For example,
criminologists have argued that criminals get immediate
(intangible) pleasure from violating the law and that some get
utility from being labeled “bad” by fellow criminals or society at
73
large. Offenders may also get immediate utility from using
criminal activity as a form of retaliation against perceived
74
injustice.
This temporal gap between the benefits and costs of
misconduct matters because people are generally impatient,
and thus, will give full weight to rewards and costs that are
75
immediate in nature but discount those that are delayed. As
we will see, an intertemporal decisionmaker will discount
delayed payoffs using a discount function that, at the very
least, captures the fact that people give less weight to costs
(and benefits) the later that they are to be incurred (or
received). The discount function used in the neoclassical model
assumes that this discount rate stays constant over time. The
discount function used in this Article reflects the evidence
(discussed in Section C) finding that decisionmakers actually
become increasingly impatient the closer that they get to an
immediate payoff. This is why the fact that the benefits from
misconduct are usually received immediately will play an
important role in our model.
There are two principal reasons why it is important for
commentators and lawmakers to understand the general
intertemporal dynamics of criminal misconduct. First, there is
overwhelming empirical evidence indicating that decisionmakers
experience intertemporal conflicts due to shifting preferences.

72. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 4, at 89 (cataloguing immediate
rewards of crime).
73. See e.g., JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME, MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS
IN DOING EVIL 312 (1988) (arguing that criminals take “delight in deviance” and “take
pride in a defiant reputation as ‘bad’”).
74. See Vai-Lam Mui, The Economics of Envy, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311, 312
(1995) (exploring “the role of envy in provoking sabotage or retaliation against others” and
stating that “envy plays an important role in social and economic life”); William Terris &
John Jones, Psychological Factors Related to Employees’ Theft in the Convenience Store
Industry, 51 PSYCHOL. REP. 1219, (1982) (finding that revenge is one of the major
motivators of employee theft).
75. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, & Ted O’Donoghue, Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 162, 162–68 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004) (describing the history of
various approaches to modeling the impatience of intertemporal decisionmakers). A
number of explanations have been offered for this general impatience. See, e.g., Derek
Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHIL. REV. 3, 26–27 (1971) (arguing that individuals discount
future payoffs because of changes in identity over time—a diminution of the connection
between our present and future selves).
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However, under the neoclassical model, an offender who has a
long-term preference to abstain from misconduct will never
override it merely because she has become more impatient.76
Second, under the neoclassical approach, the goal of lawmakers
is to choose the level of sanctions and enforcement in order to
maximize social welfare. However, to accomplish this a lawmaker
must have a correct notion of what motivates people to commit
crimes. In particular, Part V.B shows that, in order to efficiently
deter hyperbolic offenders, a lawmaker needs to adopt sanctions
and enforcement policies that directly target the offender’s shortterm preferences.
3. Intertemporally Worthwhile Misconduct. We can generalize
the discussion in the previous two sections by saying that a rational
offender will commit a crime in the current period only if she
believes that it is “intertemporally worthwhile”—if, given her beliefs
of how she plans to act in the future, the action maximizes her
77
current and future well-being. As a result, when deciding whether
to commit a crime (or a series of them) an offender: (1) will try to
predict how her preferences and those of others (e.g., co-conspirators
or lawmakers) may change over time; and (2) will choose to obey the
law if the benefits from misconduct are less than the timediscounted expected sanctions (that is, the gross sanctions,
discounted to account for both the probability that she will escape
78
detection and her level of impatience). These two components of an
offender’s decision are related in a number of ways, but we will be
concerned with just one. At the time an offender makes a decision,
her then “current self” will have a preference regarding how she
wants her various future selves to behave and, thus, will try to

76. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 11 (1996) (explaining how timeconsistent preferences require that “the choices an individual would like to make in the
future, if he knew now what would happen in the interim, are exactly the same as the
choices he will actually make then”); Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and
Self-Regulation: An Economic Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS
137, 138 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (arguing that actors “who usually
populate economic models have little doubt about ‘who they are’: they know their own
abilities and basic preferences”).
77. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON.
121, 128 (2001) (setting up a general model where people act with reasonable beliefs about
future actions and choose current actions to maximize preferences in light of those beliefs).
78. Of course, offenders may also discount the benefits side of the ledger—if there is
some risk that the benefits of crime will not materialize and if the benefits are not
received immediately. The general point is that sanctions will always be delayed and
benefits, more likely than not, will be received immediately. Except for the discussion of
time-inconsistent obedience below, I will assume that the benefits are both certain and
immediate, both of which are plausible assumptions, for many types of criminal activity.
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predict how those future selves will react to the immediate rewards
of misconduct.
B. The Assumption that Long-Term Preferences Govern
Because we will be concerned with the intertemporal conflict
between an offender’s long-run and short-run preferences, it is
necessary to specify which of the two preferences an offender wants
to govern her behavior. This Article will assume that an offender’s
“preferred” preference is to act in a time-consistent manner and not
yield to immediate gratification. The argument is not that an
offender would never want to indulge in the immediate benefits of
misconduct; rather, it is that a rational offender is no different than
other individuals who, more often than not, have long-term
preferences not to live their lives by the dictates of immediate
79
indulgence. Of course, there are isolated exceptions. A prude who
is afraid that he may let his prudishness keep him from activities
that he believes he might enjoy may indeed want the prospect of
80
immediate pleasure to move him into action.
More generally, people usually give some detached
consideration to how they want to behave in the future. Individuals
who go through life thoughtlessly acting according to whatever
desire they happen to be feeling at the time are what the
81
philosopher Harry Frankfurt calls “wantons.” While it may be that
such wantons exist among criminal offenders, I will exclude them
from consideration, as our concern is with instrumentally rational
offenders who, by definition, deliberate about the best ways of
achieving their goals. Therefore, I will assume that offenders give
some thought to the fact that they may be moved to commit crimes
79. Evidence of this is found in the commitment devices adopted by people to assure
that they save enough for retirement, exercise, and quit consuming harmful products. See
O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 60, at 10 (stating that the goal of the time-inconsistent
preference literature is to explore whether, in some instances, people engage in activities
“against their own long-run preferences due to an overpursuit of immediate
gratification”).
80. An offender who has determined that misconduct is worthwhile, but is afraid that
they may “chicken out,” may want the pull of immediate gratification to take them the extra
step. However, an offender who can predict her true propensity to chicken out from future
misconduct opportunities would be better off adopting a commitment device ahead of time to
assure that she follows through as planned. For a discussion of why such a chickening out may
be considered a self-control problem, see ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON
AKRASIA, SELF-DECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL 17–18 (1987).
81. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT,
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 47–57 (1988) (arguing that the ability of people to form secondorder preferences regarding what first-order desires they want to ultimately motivate
them is an important part of what it means to be a person); see also Richard C. Jeffrey,
Preferences Among Preferences, 71 J. PHIL. 377, 381 (1974) (discussing how people choose
their preferred preferences).
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by purely transient desires, such as the pull of immediate
gratification, and that, as a result, they have second-order
preferences about the types of desires that they want to be operative
when they are faced with the opportunity to commit a crime.
Moreover, we are assuming that a rational offender will violate
the law in the current period only if it is intertemporally
worthwhile, a deliberative process that by definition is forwardlooking; in other words, the offender will have to form a belief about
how she expects to behave in the future and make various tradeoffs
between her current and future well-being. A rational serial
offender may willingly engage in time-inconsistent misconduct once
or twice if she believes that they are isolated cases. What we rule
out are serial offenders who want to repeatedly yield to immediate
gratification. After all, such a resolutely present-biased strategy
would make it difficult for an offender to coordinate with coconspirators, avoid detection by the authorities, comply with the
terms of parole, or avoid a “third-strike” conviction.
In conclusion, a serial offender is more likely to survive and
succeed if she adopts a second-order preference not to allow her
short-term preference for immediate gratification to influence her
decision to violate the law. Such an approach would allow her to
make detached and objective cost-benefit analyses and, thus, to
commit crimes only when they are worthwhile from a long-term
perspective. For example, a hyperbolic criminal who knows that
robbing a bank on Friday would yield the greatest return would not
want to let her transient preference for immediate gratification
move her to rob it earlier in the week.
C. The Empirical Evidence Regarding Time-Inconsistent
Preferences
The principal challenge to the time-consistency assumption of
neoclassical theory originated in a series of experiments finding
that people value immediate gratification and therefore exhibit
declining, instead of constant, discount rates. In short, people
discount immediate payoffs more steeply than they discount those
82
same payoffs from a long-term perspective. A common type of
experiment to test whether people have time-inconsistent

82. See GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 63–80 (1992) (describing evidence of
declining discount rates and using hyperbolas to model them); Harris & Laibson, supra
note 7, at 258 (stating that generalized hyperbolic discount functions decline at a faster
rate in the short-run than in the long-run, matching a key feature of experimental data);
George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573, 579–81 (1992) (setting forth hyperbolic discount
function).
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preferences asks subjects to choose between a smaller, earlier
reward and a higher, delayed one, where in some instances the
smaller reward can be received immediately and in others both the
smaller and larger rewards are delayed until future periods.
In an early study, the economist Richard Thaler told subjects to
imagine that they had won a lottery and could choose to either
receive the money immediately or leave it in the bank earning
83
interest. He then asked them how much interest they would
require to make them indifferent between receiving $15
84
immediately or in three, twelve, and thirty-six months. The
required median returns were $30, $60, and $100, respectively,
which translates into continuously compounded discount rates of
277%, 139%, and 63%, for the three, twelve, and thirty-six month
85
delays. As can be seen, the implicit discount rate declined as the
86
delay in receiving the money increased.
A similar type of experiment provides subjects with a menu
like the one below and asks them to choose their preferred outcome
from each group (note that A and B are identical except that the
smaller reward in A.1 will be received immediately):
A.1: $1 today; or
A.2: $2 tomorrow.
B.1: $1 in one year; or
B.2: $2 in one year and one day.

A time-consistent rational person who wants to maximize her
returns would choose A.2 and B.2; however, in experiments, people
routinely choose the immediate reward provided by A.1 and higher
delayed reward of B.2. For example, Kirby and Herrnstein asked
subjects to choose between two expensive prizes, with the better of
87
the two to be received later in time. When the subjects had the
ability to choose the smaller prize immediately they did so;
however, when both prizes were delayed, the subjects chose the
88
better prize. Moreover, this present-bias is not limited to humans.
83. See RICHARD H. THALER, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency,
in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 127, 128–29 (1991).
84. Id. at 130.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 129.
87. See Kris N. Kirby & Richard J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversals Due to Myopic
Discounting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 84–85 (1995).
88. Id. at 85–86. Researchers have conducted numerous similar experiments and have
consistently found that subjects exhibited declining discount rates. See, e.g., AINSLIE, supra
note 82, at 63–80 (describing evidence of declining discount rates and use of hyperbolas to
model them); Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport & Joseph Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred from
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A number of studies have found that animals, such as pigeons89 and
90
rats, also exhibit declining discount rates.
A recent brain imaging study provides one possible
explanation for why humans (as well as animals) have a
91
preference for immediate gratification. McClure, along with
other researchers, measured the brain activity of participants
who were offered a series of binary choices, each with a smaller
92
earlier reward and a larger delayed one. Some choices involved
a smaller immediate reward, while in others both payoffs were
93
delayed. The brain imaging found that when the participants
were faced with the prospect of an immediate reward, the limbic
structures—the part of the brain associated with impulsive
94
behavior—exhibited disproportionate activity.
Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGMT. SCI. 270, 282–83 (1989) (finding declining
discount rates); Gretchen B. Chapman, Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and
Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL 771, 779 (1996) (finding steeper discounting over short
delays than longer delays for money rewards and hypothetical health outcomes); Harris &
Laibson, supra note 7, at 258 (stating that generalized hyperbolic discount functions decline at
a faster rate in short-run than in long-run, matching key feature of experimental data); Kris N.
Kirby & Nino N. Marakovic, Modeling Myopic Decisions: Evidence for Hyperbolic DelayDiscounting Within Subjects and Amounts, 64 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22,
25 (1995) (finding that hyperbolic function is better fit to results of an experiment with twentytwo college student subjects); Kris N. Kirby, Nancy M. Petry & Warren K. Bickel, Heroin
Addicts Have Higher Discount Rates for Delayed Rewards Than Non-Drug-Using Controls, 128
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 78, 84 (1999) (finding greater amount of short-term impatience
among heroin addicts); Joel Myerson & Leonard Green, Discounting of Delayed Rewards:
Models of Individual Choice, 64 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 263, 272 (1995) (finding
hyperbolic function a better fit to results of an experiment with twelve undergraduate
subjects).
89. See George Ainslie & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversal and Delayed
Reinforcement, 9 ANIMAL LEARNING & BEHAV. 476, 479 (1981) (finding that pigeons exhibit
declining discount rates in a manner resembling hyperbolic discounting); see also Shin-Ho
Chung & R.J. Herrnstein, Choice and Delay of Reinforcement, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
BEHAV. 67, 68–73 (1967) (same); Drazen Prelec & R.J. Herrnstein, Feedback Functions for
Reinforcement: A Paradigmatic Experiment, 6 ANIMAL LEARNING & BEHAV. 181, 181–86 (1978)
(same). See generally A. W. Logue, The Living Legacy of the Harvard Pigeon Lab: Quantitative
Analysis in the Wide World, 77 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 357, 363 (2002) (reviewing
these animal studies and their influence on various disciplines).
90. See Jerry B. Richards et al., Determination of Discount Functions in Rats with an
Adjusting-Amount Procedure, 67 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 353, 358–59 (1997)
(finding implicit discount rates that decline over time in a manner resembling hyperbolic
discounting).
91. See Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and
Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCI. 503, 504 (2004) (finding that certain points of the
limbic system are activated by decisions involving immediate gratification).
92. Id. at 505.
93. Id.
94. Id. The researchers also found that the some areas of the prefrontal cortex, an
area of the brain associated with more deliberate decisionmaking, were active whenever
the participants made a choice, whether or not those rewards were immediate in nature.
Id. This makes sense because the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in collecting
and mediating inputs between different areas of the brain to assist the subject in
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Some of the strongest evidence that people have timeinconsistent preferences comes from the observation that, in the
95
real world, people routinely adopt commitment devices.
Commitment devices are mechanisms adopted by individuals to
restrict their future ability to yield to the pull of immediate
96
gratification. Such devices are costly to implement, and even if
they were available at zero cost, people are reluctant to restrict
97
their future ability to act freely unless they believe that pre98
commitment was otherwise worthwhile. As a result, in a world

planning and decisionmaking. Jacqueline N. Wood & Jordan Grafman, Human Prefrontal
Cortex: Processing and Representational Perspectives, 4 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCIENCE,
139, 140 (2003). However, the researchers found that participants who were given a
choice between a smaller immediate and a larger delayed reward and chose the larger
delayed one exhibited significantly greater activity in the pre-frontal cortex than those
participants who chose the earlier smaller reward. McClure et al., supra note 91, at 505.
In fact, damage to the pre-frontal cortex has been shown to lead both humans and
animals to become more impulsive and more likely to yield to the prospect of immediate
gratification. See Stephen B. Manuck et al., A Neurobiology of Intertemporal Choice, in
TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL
CHOICE 139, 146–47 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (discussing studies of humans
and animals with prefrontal cortex damage which find that such individuals have a
greater propensity to grab immediate rewards).
95. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 105 (noting that economists use
commitment devices as evidence—“smoking guns”—of time-inconsistent preferences).
96. More generally, a commitment device is a type of externally imposed selfregulation mechanism adopted to overcome self-control problems when relying on internal
sources of self-regulation is not sufficient. See ROY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING
CONTROL: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 6–7 (1994) (describing the
ability among human beings “to exert control over one’s own inner states, processes, and
responses” and defining self-regulation as “any effort by a human being to alter its own
responses” so as to override the push to act in ways that diverge from what they really
want).
97. One cost of commitment is that people generally value their autonomy and find
disutility in having their wills constrained unnecessarily. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 13–14 (1981) (discussing the cost of
commitment and autonomy in the realm of interpersonal contracts).
98. Once we introduce the potential of uncertainty regarding future payoffs, an
intertemporal decisionmaker may find it valuable to have an option to reverse her
original decision. On the creation of option values by waiting to make irreversible
investments until a decisionmaker has acquired greater information, see AVINASH K.
DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER CERTAINTY 6–9 (1994). See also ANDREU
MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 689–90 (1995) (discussing how the passage
of time aids in revealing true states of the world and resolving uncertainty). In addition to
the general economic consideration, an individual may want the ability to change her
mind out of fear that she may grow to regret her original decision. For example,
psychologists have found that individuals often prefer changeable decisions because they
predict, sometimes incorrectly, that they will not be satisfied with the choices they made.
See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective
Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 510–11
(2002) (finding that, although the individuals who were given the choice to change their
minds about which photography prints to keep liked their choices less than those
individuals who had no ability to change, individuals still preferred having the option to
change).
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of time-consistent actors, commitment devices would not exist.99
Nonetheless, people with long-term preferences to eat healthily,
exercise, and lose weight join health clubs and go to special
weight-loss spas, both of which require costly up-front
commitments. Students and professors use deadlines (preferably
100
externally imposed) to combat the temptation to procrastinate
completing papers. Additionally, the economist David Laibson
has argued that people with long-term preferences to set enough
money aside for retirement make highly illiquid investments in
their youth—purchasing homes—to prevent themselves from
overconsuming early in life; retirement accounts with penalties
101
for withdrawals serve similar purposes.
More recently, researchers have begun to supplement the
evidence from laboratory experiments with other types of
empirical studies. For example, in a field experiment in the
Philippines, 1,767 bank customers answered questionnaires that
elicited their present-biased premium; half were then given the
choice of opening an account with a built-in commitment device
102
in the form of withdrawal restrictions. The study found that
customers with higher levels of present-bias were more likely to
accept the offer to open the account and that those who did
increased their savings by 86.3%. The study also reported that a
number of participants had previously participated in informal
savings clubs with similar commitment features.

99. See Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbrook, Procrastination, Deadlines, and
Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 223 (“A rational
decision maker with time-consistent preferences would not impose constraints on his or
her choices.”).
100. See, e.g., T.C. Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 290, 290 (1978) (discussing externally imposed self-control devices such as creating an
inaccessible savings account and overstating dependents for tax purposes in order to reduce
tax liability in April); see also Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 99, at 220–23 (analyzing the
role of self-imposed deadlines in addressing temptation to procrastinate); Wertenbroch, supra
note 3, at 318 (describing the strategic self-imposition of constraints in the context of
purchasing cigarettes). Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs require minimum stays and
full payment (up-front) for the required treatment period, a part of which is kept if the patient
checks out early. For example, the Cirque Lodge, a well-known facility of this type, has a
thirty-day minimum stay and requires patients to pay for that thirty-day period at the time
that they check in. See The Cirque Lodge, Admission Guidelines, http://www.cirquelodge.com/
Admission/AdmissionGuidelines.php (last visited Aug. 7, 2007) (requiring that “[a] deposit
for 30 days is due upon admission”).
101. See David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions,
42 EUR. ECON. REV. 861, 868 (1998) (discussing commitment devices to deal with
procrastination in saving for retirement, including channeling funds to illiquid assets
such as defined benefit pensions, 401(k)’s, social security contributions, and home equity).
102. See Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines 2 (Apr. 11, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Houston Law Review).
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D. Modeling Short-Run Impatience and Time-Inconsistency
So far this Part has made three principal arguments. First,
whenever an offender chooses to violate the law she is making an
intertemporal decision, given that, by definition, if she were to be
sanctioned, it would not be until some later point in time. A
rational offender would discount those delayed sanctions to
account for her level of impatience; however, whether this
discounting has a material effect on the offender’s ultimate
decision will depend on her level of impatience and the type of
discount function that she uses. A time-consistent offender has a
constant discount rate and is unlikely to be affected by the
delayed nature of punishment, unless she is very impatient.
From a long-term perspective, a hyperbolic offender discounts the
immediate rewards from crime in the same manner as her timeconsistent counterpart. However, when faced with the
opportunity to commit the crime, the hyperbolic offender gives
added weight to the immediate rewards of misconduct, and thus,
may override her original preferences and commit nonworthwhile
crimes.
Second, I argued that the intertemporal nature of crime is
magnified whenever offenders engage in serial misconduct. A
rational serial offender would want to violate the law only when
doing so is intertemporally worthwhile—if it maximizes her
intertemporal return, given her beliefs about how she expects to
behave in the future. For example, a hyperbolic offender may
decide to yield to immediate gratification in the current period if
she believes that it will not happen again, but may feel very
differently if she believed that she would make a habit of it.
Third, I provided a set of arguments for why a rational serial
offender would want to adopt a long-term preference to act in a
time-consistent fashion. This claim received greater support from
the evidence discussed in the previous section regarding the
prevalent use of commitment devices by real-world actors.
This section will provide a more formal account of timeconsistent and time-inconsistent discounting, and the following
one will extend the general hyperbolic model to the context of
time-inconsistent misconduct. Economists model intertemporal
decisions using an intertemporal utility function that sums up the
instantaneous utility (the payoffs) in each relevant time period as
discounted to account for an actor’s time preference. It follows
that a rational actor will choose her behavior to maximize her
103
Early work formalizing
discounted intertemporal utility.
103.

See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 106.
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intertemporal choice used an exponential discount function,
which, as it happens, is the only type that guarantees the
constant discounting104 that yields time-consistent preferences.105
Importantly, economists embraced exponential discounting
because it made their models more tractable mathematically, not
because they believed that real-world actors use exponential
106
functions.
In order to model the time-inconsistent behavior reflected in
the empirical evidence described above, many economists use a
highly tractable quasi-hyperbolic discount function that draws a
107
sharp distinction between immediate and delayed gratification.
From a long-term perspective, when all costs and benefits are
delayed, the quasi-hyperbolic and exponential models are
identical. That is, in period 0, both the exponential and
hyperbolic actor would discount their delayed instantaneous
utility in periods 1 through T using an exponential function: δu1 ,
δ 2 u2 , δ 3u3 , . . . , δ T uT , where the discount factor, δ , which is set
108
to less than 1, captures a decisionmaker’s long-run impatience.

104. See Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, supra note 75, at 166–67 (stating
that the exponential function is the only one that ensures that actors will exhibit constant
levels of impatience).
105. Id. at 170 (“Constant discounting implies that a person’s intertemporal
preferences are time-consistent, which means that later preferences ‘confirm’ earlier
preferences.”).
106. See BECKER, supra note 76, at 11 (“The assumption of consistent preferences is
clearly not a literal description of much actual behavior . . . but it is an extremely useful
simplification of behavior.”); Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, supra note 75, at
167 (noting that Samuelson and Koopman, the two economists most responsible for
formalizing the intertemporal utility model, never endorsed the exponential discount
function as an accurate representation of the myriad psychological factors that motivate
individuals to discount future payoffs). Unlike the large body of evidence supporting the
time-inconsistency assumption, there is no systematic evidence finding that people have
constant discount rates. See Warren K. Bickel & Matthew W. Johnson, Delay Discounting:
A Fundamental Behavioral Process of Drug Dependence, in TIME AND DECISION:
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE, supra note
94, at 419, 422 (stating that “[e]xponential discounting . . . has not been empirically
supported by behavioral research” conducted in humans and animals); see also infra Part
III.C (describing evidence that real-world actors have declining discount rates).
107. Economists have used other hyperbolic functions to model decisionmakers with
declining discount rates; however, the quasi-hyperbolic function has achieved wide
acceptance because it captures a basic empirical fact—that people give greater value to
the same exact payoff when they can receive it immediately than when it is delayed by
any amount of time—without adding too much complexity to models. See David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 449–51 (1997) (setting
forth quasi-hyperbolic function). For an early treatment of time-inconsistent preferences,
see R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV.
ECON. STUD. 165, 165 (1955–1956) (analyzing intertemporal planning problem in which
individuals choose consumption plans to maximize future utility, but tend to adopt future
behavior which is inconsistent with their chosen plans).
108. More formally, if ui is the immediate (or instantaneous) utility that the
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Both types of actors will have a long-term preference to act in a
manner that maximizes the sum of these δ -discounted
instantaneous utilities.
The difference between the two approaches only arises when
a decisionmaker has the prospect of grabbing an immediate
benefit (or incurring an immediate cost). From the perspective of
period 1, the exponential discounter will give full weight to the
instantaneous utility in that period while discounting those in
periods 2 through T using the same exponential function as
before: u1 , δu , δ 2 u3 , δ 3u4 , . . . δ T −1uT . As seen, from both a longterm and short-term perspective, the exponential actor compares
her instantaneous utility in periods 1 and 2, by discounting the
latter by δ . More generally, under the exponential function, a
person will always discount payoffs between any two adjacent
109
periods by her discount factor δ . This ensures that she will
have time-consistent preferences, given that she will always
reach the same conclusion vis-à-vis the relative value of payoffs,
regardless of the time-period in which she makes that
110
assessment.
However, the quasi-hyperbolic function introduces a shortterm discount factor, β , which is set to less than 1, that acts as a
multiplier that is inert when all payoffs are in the future but
magnifies immediate costs and benefits. This short-term
multiplier captures a hyperbolic actor’s preference for immediate
gratification. In period 0, exponential and hyperbolic actors
discount their delayed period-1 instantaneous utility using their
long-term discount factor—they value it as δu1 . However, from
the short-term perspective of period 1, an exponential actor
hyperbolic discounter would receive in period 1, in period 0, she gives full weight to an
immediate payoff and discounts those in periods 1 through T in the following manner:
u0 , βδu1 , βδ 2 u2 , βδ 3u3 , . . . , βδ T uT . On the other hand, an exponential discounter would
discount: u0 , δu1 , δ 2 u2 , δ 3u3 , . . . , δ T uT . Since β is the same in all periods, in period 0,
they compare periods 1 through T in the same manner by: δu1 , δ 2 u2 , δ 3u3 , . . . , δ T uT .
For example, suppose that in period 0, both types of discounters are interested in payoffs
in periods 1 and 3. The exponential actor would compare δ 3u3 − δu1 = δ 3 δ u3 − u1 = δ 2 u3 − u1 .
δ 2 u3 − u1 ,
since
The
hyperbolic
actor
would
also
compare
between
βδ 3u3 − βδu1 = βδ 3 βδ u3 − u1 = δ 2 u3 − u1 .
109. More formally, let ui be the nondiscounted instantaneous utility in period 1. In
period 0, a person using the exponential discount function will give full weight to an
immediate payoff u0 , while discounting delayed payoffs using her long-term discount
factor, as follows: in δu1 , δ 2 u2 , δ 3u3 , . . . , δ 10 u10 , δ 11u11 . This means that in period 0 and in
period 10, the person discounts between periods 10 and 11 by her discount factor δ . In
period 0, the person compares δ 10 u10 with δ 11u11 , or equivalently u10 with δ 11 δ 10 u11 = δu11 .
Moreover, when period u10 arrives, she compares the immediate utility of u10 with δu11 ,
and thus reaches the same result.
110. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 106 (stating that under constant
discounting, “[a] person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later
date is the same no matter when she is asked”).
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values the immediate payoff at its face value (as u1 ), but a
hyperbolic actor’s preference for immediate gratification leads
her to give it greater weight, which is captured by the
multiplier—she now values the immediate payoff as u1 β . For
example, a person with a β of 0.5 gives 50% greater weight to a
reward when it is immediate in nature than she did from a longterm perspective, while someone with a β of 0.7 gives 30% added
weight.
More specifically, when all payoffs are delayed, the
hyperbolic actor (in keeping with her exponential counterpart)
compares the instantaneous utility in periods 1 and 2 by giving
full weight to the earlier utility and discounting the latter by δ ;
moreover, she will have a long-term preference to behave in a
manner that maximizes the sum of the two:
δu1 + δ 2 u2 = u1 + δu2 .
When period 1 arrives, the hyperbolic actor still discounts
the period 2 utility by δ , but now gives added weight to the
immediate payoff and makes a short-run decision to maximize
the sum of:
u1 β + δu2 .
Since a hyperbolic actor by definition has a β that is less
than 1, it will always be the case that u1 β will be greater than
u1 . We can refer to the difference between the two as a hyperbolic
actor’s “immediacy premium.” It follows that if this immediacy
premium is high enough, a hyperbolic actor will reverse her long111
term preferences.
Finally, because by definition exponential actors give no
added weight to the prospect of immediate gratification, they can
be easily incorporated into the quasi-hyperbolic model by giving
them a β equal to 1.
A numerical example can help illustrate the difference
between exponential and hyperbolic discounting. Suppose that in
period 0, hyperbolic John and exponential Mary are asked to
choose between receiving $15, $20, or $25 in periods 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. They both have a long-term discount factor of 0.9,
but John has a short-term factor of 0.5. They will both discount
111. More generally, in period 0, the exponential discounter compares between a
period 1 payoff and those in periods 2 through T , in the following manner: u1 , δu2 , δ 2 u3 ,
δ 3u4 , . . . , δ T −1uT . When period 1 arrives, she will discount as before and reach the same
conclusion. On the other hand, in period 0, the hyperbolic actor compares between βu1 ,
βδu2 , βδ 2 u3 , βδ 3u4 , . . . , βδ T −1uT . And in period 1, she gives full weight to u1 , while still
discounting the later payoffs by βδu2 , βδ 2 u3 , βδ 3u4 , . . . , βδ T −1uT . Since β < 1, u1 will
always be greater than βu1 , which is what can lead her to exhibit time-inconsistent
preferences.
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these delayed payoffs by δ , δ 2 , and δ 3 , respectively, and thus
will have a long-term preference to wait until period 3 and
receive the $25, since they would compare:
(0.9 ∗ $15) = $13.50
(0.81 ∗ $20) = $16.20
(0.73 ∗ $25) = $18.25.

If in period 1 they were both to reconsider their decisions,
exponential Mary would reach the same conclusion, since she
now compares:
(1 ∗ $15) = $15
(0.9 ∗ $20) = $18
(0.81 ∗ $25) = $20.25.

Moreover, in period 2 she would again decide to wait until
period 3, given that the immediate $20 is less than 0.9 ∗ $25, or
$22.50. As can be seen, exponential Mary’s preferences are
consistent over time.
On the other hand, when in period 1, hyperbolic John
reconsiders the original decision, his immediacy premium will
lead him to grab the $15 instead of waiting until period 3. This is
because he will compare:
($15/0.5) = $30
(0.9 ∗ $20) = $18
(0.81 ∗ $25) = $20.25

Therefore, unlike exponential Mary, hyperbolic John
exhibits
time-inconsistent
preferences.
Importantly,
by
overriding his long-term preference to act in a time-consistent
manner, hyperbolic John chose to receive $15 instead of the
period-3 discounted $20.25, and thus incurred a welfare loss of
$5.25.
E. Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
While economists have come to realize the shortcomings of
exponential discount functions, law and economics scholars have
been slow to follow suit, which explains why, as a matter of
course, offenders in economics-inspired models of criminal
112
misconduct behave in a time-consistent fashion. This section
112. Academic disciplines (like other institutions) are often affected by historical
contingencies of this sort and are sometimes slow to shed simplifying—path-dependent—
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shows that hyperbolic offenders can engage in time-inconsistent
misconduct, a phenomenon that is obscured by the timeconsistency assumption of the neoclassical model. Because the
only difference between exponential and hyperbolic actors is in
how they discount when one of the payoffs is immediate, in what
follows I will assume, without loss of generality, that there is no
long-term discounting, or, equivalently that offenders have a
113
long-term discount factor, δ , that is equal to 1. This allows us
to isolate the role played by an offender’s present-bias. It should
be noted that the neoclassical model adopts the same
assumption, given that as a general matter it is unlikely that an
offender will have a sufficiently large long-term discount factor to
114
materially alter her decision.
Misconduct is “long-run worthwhile” when from a long-term
perspective the discounted, delayed benefits exceed the
discounted, delayed expected sanctions. As we are assuming that
there is no long-term impatience, a crime is long-run worthwhile
whenever the following inequality holds true:
(benefits) – (expected sanctions) > 0
Given the discussion in Section B about the “preferred”
preferences of hyperbolic offenders, I will assume that both
exponential and hyperbolic offenders have a long-term preference
to commit crimes if and only if they are long-run worthwhile.
This means that a hyperbolic offender who, from a long-term
perspective, has concluded that a crime is not worthwhile will not
want to override that decision.
However, what really matters is an offender’s behavior when
she is presented with the opportunity to commit a crime.
Misconduct is “short-run worthwhile” whenever the immediate
benefits, as magnified by the short-term multiplier, are greater
than the delayed expected sanctions. Because the neoclassical
exponential offender has a short-term factor of β = 1, all other

assumptions whose benefits hindsight has shown do not add up to the costs. See Manuel
A. Utset, Back to School with Coase: The Production of Information and Modes of
Knowledge Within and Across Academic Disciplines, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1063, 1073–74, 1085
(1995) (describing the role of path-dependence within academic disciplines and its effect
on the sharing of information and knowledge across disciplines).
113. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 107 n.11 (showing that results of
quasi-hyperbolic model are not affected by assuming that δ = 1).
114. Long-term discounting is sometimes reintroduced when discussing
imprisonment. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and
Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6
(1999) (discussing the role of exponential discounting in calculating the overall disutility
of prison sentences when there are variations among populations regarding their level of
long-term discounting—e.g., some offenders are risk neutral while others are risk averse).
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things being equal, she will conclude that a crime is short-run
worthwhile if and only if it was long-run worthwhile.
On the other hand, misconduct is short-run worthwhile for a
hyperbolic offender whenever the immediate benefits, with the
added present-bias premium, are greater than the delayed
expected sanctions. More specifically, a hyperbolic offender will
consider a crime to be short-run worthwhile whenever the
following inequality holds:
(benefits)/ β – (expected sanctions) > 0
Whenever a hyperbolic offender commits a crime that is not
long-run worthwhile, she engages in time-inconsistent
misconduct, which occurs whenever the following holds:
(benefits)/ β – (expected sanctions) > 0 ≥ (benefits) –
(expected sanctions)
Finally, notice that the immediate benefits from misconduct
can be of two types. First, an offender may take a prohibited
action that provides her with an immediate reward, such as
embezzling funds, discharging pollutants into a stream, or
making a false disclosure in a securities filing. A hyperbolic
offender may overconsume crimes of this sort in the same
manner that a person with a long-term preference not to smoke
115
or overeat may repeatedly succumb to temptation. We can thus
refer to this type of serial misconduct as “nibbling
116
opportunism.”
Secondly, many laws and regulations require that an
individual take an action by a specific date—for example, filing
tax returns, making corporate disclosures, and complying with
environmental regulations. However, a person will have to exert
effort and, in most cases, incur other immediate costs in order to
comply. A hyperbolic offender who has a long-term preference to
comply on time will nonetheless procrastinate taking the

115. In a recent example, employees in a ski resort engaged in a scheme to skim
money off cash registers by canceling out parts of completed transactions. They were
successful for a relatively long period of time, but were finally detected when one of the
employees could not forego the ongoing temptation and started taking money every five
minutes. See Register Scheme Exposed at D.V., Workers Took $800 Each, PARK CITY REC.,
Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://www.parkrecord.com/archivesearch.
116. As a general matter, an actor acts opportunistically when she tries to
renegotiate a contract ex post due to the acquisition of new information or a windfall of
bargaining power. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING, 30–31 (1985) (discussing the
role of contracts in reducing opportunistic behavior of transacting parties). A hyperbolic
offender has a long-term preference that her future self does not act opportunistically by
renegotiating the previous understanding—not to give any weight to the present-bias
premium.
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required action in each period in which these immediate costs, as
magnified by the short-term multiplier, are greater than the
incremental delayed sanction of waiting one more period.117 Each
time that she does so, she engages in time-inconsistent
misconduct. For example, assume that an environmental
regulation requires compliance by a specified deadline and
triggers expected sanctions of $100 for each one-day delay. If the
immediate cost of taking the required action is $60, a hyperbolic
actor with a short-term factor of 0.5 will choose to procrastinate.
F. Welfare Losses from Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
There are two principal types of social costs associated with
118
time-inconsistent misconduct. First, aggregate social welfare
will be reduced any time that an offender commits a crime that
creates a greater amount of harm than the benefits that she
receives. Even if each hyperbolic offender in society engages in
time-inconsistent misconduct just once, the aggregate losses
created can be large (although the actual magnitude would
depend on the distribution of offenders with different levels of
119
present-bias). The second type of social cost is counterintuitive
but no less real than the first. An offender will harm herself each
time she overrides her long-term preference by making shortterm decisions to commit nonworthwhile crimes. In other words,
120
time-inconsistent misconduct is a type of rationality “mistake.”
117. See George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1
(1991) (declaring that individuals procrastinate “when present costs are unduly salient in
comparison with future costs, leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow
without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, the required action will be delayed yet
again”); O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 104 (distinguishing between
overconsumption—taking action when one should wait, given that costs are delayed and
benefits immediate—and procrastination, which is defined as delaying action one should
take, because of immediate costs and delayed rewards).
118. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 112–14 (describing methods for
calculating welfare losses due to time-inconsistency).
119. The harm to society is analogous to the one created by offenders who commit
crimes when: (1) the benefits they receive are lower than the harm to society; but (2) those
benefits are higher than the maximum fines that they will be able to pay due to wealth
constraints. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 884–85 (1979); Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 18, at 51 (stating that sanctions via fines should be exhausted before
using prison sanctions because sanctions are wealth transfers and are generally cheaper
to collect than the social costs of imprisonment).
120. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 112–13 (proposing long-term
perspective welfare criterion and referring to time-inconsistent actions as a type of “bad
decision”). But see Harris & Laibson, supra note 7, at 285–86 (examining different
methods of calculating welfare loss and explaining that, although there is no clear
consensus among economists as to which welfare measure is more appropriate, the
various proposed approaches “usually give similar answers to policy questions”).
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This is because nonworthwhile crimes are those that, from a
long-term perspective, would give an offender benefits that are
less than the expected sanctions.
Notice that a hyperbolic offender’s maximum welfare loss
from one act of time-inconsistent misconduct cannot exceed her
immediacy premium, which is equivalent to the benefits, as
perceived from a short-term perspective, minus the nondistorted
benefits from a long-term perspective—(benefits)/ β – (benefits).
This means that an offender’s welfare losses will increase as her
preference for immediate gratification, as captured by the shortterm multiplier, increases.
For example, assume that hyperbolic John, who has a β of
0.7, is considering committing a crime that is not long-run
worthwhile, because the crime would provide him with an
immediate benefit of $100 but trigger expected sanctions of $130.
Although John has a long-term preference to obey the law, his
present-bias premium will lead him to engage in timeinconsistent misconduct—($100/0.7) = $142.86, which is greater
than the $130 expected sanctions. This means that John will
incur a welfare loss of $30, which is the difference between the
expected sanctions and the actual benefits—that is, the
nondistorted benefits that a time-consistent neoclassical offender
would perceive as the actual benefits. The maximum welfare loss
that John can experience, however, cannot exceed $42.85. This is
because if the expected sanctions were raised to $142.86, John
would conclude that the crime is not short-run worthwhile and
obey the law.
A hyperbolic offender’s welfare losses are a valid concern
under the neoclassical approach because the aggregate benefits
to offenders from their criminal activity are part of the social
121
welfare calculus; it follows that the same should be the case for
welfare losses that are due to an offender’s time-inconsistent
misconduct. Additionally, as we will see in Part IV, lawmakers
can reduce the cost of deterring crime if they take into account
the time-inconsistent preferences of offenders. Time-consistent
offenders who are already optimally deterred by neoclassical
sanctions would not be harmed by sanctions that directly target
the short-term preferences of hyperbolic offenders. At the same
time, a hyperbolic offender who has a long-term preference to
abstain from nonworthwhile misconduct would want society to
properly deter her. She may, of course, feel differently ex post—

121. See Becker, supra note 15, at 173, 181–85 (arguing that the benefit received by
offenders should be included in the social calculus).
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from a short-term perspective—but what really governs is her ex
ante preference.
In other words, an offender who is sufficiently aware of her
time-inconsistency would want her future self deterred so that it
cannot commit nonworthwhile crimes. She can either adopt her
own commitment device or have the state impose it on her. Even
if one allows that state-imposed commitment creates some
intangible “paternalism cost”, the hyperbolic offender would still
prefer the state action as long as that cost is less than the
122
welfare loss from time-inconsistent misconduct.
G. Serial Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
This Article is concerned with the aggregate welfare losses
produced by serial time-inconsistent misconduct which, unlike
the loss from one-shot misconduct, has no upper bound and thus
can be very large. Whether or not a hyperbolic offender engages
in repeated nonworthwhile misconduct will depend on two
principal factors (in addition to her preference for immediate
gratification). The first factor is an offender’s awareness of her
future willpower to abstain from committing nonworthwhile
crimes. This requires not only that an offender know that she has
a present bias but also that she can predict with sufficient
accuracy the true magnitude of the immediacy premium that she
will apply when she is presented with the prospect of receiving
123
the immediate rewards of committing a crime. The second
factor is the availability of cost-effective commitment devices that
she can use to deter her future self.
1. The Role of Incorrect Beliefs of Future Present-Bias. We
want to distinguish between two types of actions available to an
offender in any one period. First, an offender may have an
opportunity to commit a crime and must decide whether to obey
the law. The second type of action is prophylactic in nature. Each
period, an offender must decide whether to adopt a commitment
124
device to foreclose future time-inconsistent misconduct.
122. This problem is similar to the one described in the economic literature on
renegotiation of contracts: parties to a contract may want to precommit to their ex ante
preference to abstain from renegotiating the contract ex post. See Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 756 (1988).
123. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 103 (implying that time-inconsistent
preferences are due to a “tendency to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immediate
costs in a way that our ‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate”).
124. This sort of intrapersonal commitment is analogous to interpersonal
commitment by contracting parties. On the use of contracts to deter interpersonal
opportunism, see POSNER, supra note 11, at 94–95 (stating that a role of contract law “is
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Offenders who are sufficiently mistaken about the true
magnitude of their future self-control problems will see no value
in adopting them.
Of course, offenders may face both types of decisions in any
one period. However, even if offenders are committing
nonworthwhile crimes in the current period, it does not
necessarily follow that they will see the need to adopt
commitment devices. One of the insidious aspects of repeated
self-control problems is that, even when individuals are yielding
in the current period, they are often overly optimistic about their
future willpower. It is these incorrect beliefs about how they
expect to behave in the future that can lead offenders to
repeatedly forego commitment and engage in serial time125
inconsistent misconduct.
More generally, whether an offender in any one period
chooses to commit a crime, to adopt commitment devices, or both,
will depend on her beliefs of how she will behave in future
periods; in short, whether she believes that taking such an action
is intertemporally worthwhile. At one end of the spectrum are
naïve hyperbolic offenders—those who incorrectly believe that in
the future they will not give added weight to immediate
126
gratification and thus will behave in a time-consistent fashion.
Because of this false optimism, naïve offenders will see no value
in adopting commitment devices and little harm in indulging in
the current period—it is the same phenomenon as taking an
extra slice of cake believing that the diet will definitely start
tomorrow. For these two reasons, naïve offenders are the most
likely to engage in repeated time-inconsistent misconduct and

to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order
to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly
self-protective measures”). Nonetheless, there is an important difference between the two.
In the interpersonal context, repeat players may forgo acting opportunistically in order to
protect the prospect of future transactions. However, a critical aspect of a person’s
intrapersonal relationship with her future selves is that it cannot be severed voluntarily
(except by suicide); therefore, it follows that intrapersonal reputation will not be a very
effective mechanism for dealing with self-control problems.
125. These incorrect beliefs are what motivate repeated time-inconsistent behavior in
general models of procrastination and overconsumption. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra
note 10, at 108 (describing the difference between time-consistent and hyperbolic
individuals as the fact that the latter have incorrect beliefs of how they expect to behave
in future periods); see also David Laibson, Decision-Making, Intertemporal, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 915, 918 (Lynn Nadel ed., 2003) (stating that timeinconsistency is due to the fact that projects may appear worthwhile from a distance, “but
as the moment for sacrifice approaches the project becomes increasingly unappealing”).
126. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 108 (stating that naïve
procrastinators act as if in future periods they will have time-consistent preferences and
will face no self-control problems).
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incur large aggregate welfare losses. The offenders described in
the criminology literature on self-control problems are, by and
large, naïve ones.127
At the other end of the awareness spectrum are
sophisticated hyperbolic offenders—those who know that they
will have future self-control problems and correctly predict the
128
A sophisticated
magnitude of their present-bias premium.
offender who has available cost-effective commitment devices will
not engage in repeated time-inconsistent misconduct. However,
the empirical evidence shows that, even when people know that
they have self-control problems, they still often fail to correctly
129
predict the magnitude of their future temptations. A partially
naïve offender is one that, although aware of her present-bias, is
overoptimistic about her future ability not to yield to it. As a
result, a partially naïve offender may adopt commitment devices,
but those devices may not be sufficiently high-powered to
foreclose all nonworthwhile misconduct. Importantly, even
relatively small prediction errors can lead a partially naïve
offender to act in the same manner as a naïve one and, therefore,
130
to incur large aggregate welfare losses.
2. Entry Into and Exit from a Path of Serial Misconduct.
Entry into crime is no different than entry decisions in other
contexts; it requires initial effort and search and may require a
leap of faith or unfounded optimism to overcome anxiety induced

127. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 4, at 177 (arguing that the level of
self-control established early in life remains stable, but also stating that “[f]ortunately,
again, crimes require more than individual tendencies for their performance”). But see
Charles R. Tittle, David A. Ward, & Harold G. Grasmick, Capacity for Self-Control and
Individuals’ Interest in Exercising Self-Control, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143,
151 (2004) (drawing a distinction between people’s capacity for self-control and their
interest in engaging in self-regulation, which is closely related to an offender’s
environment).
128. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 108–09 (describing sophisticated
individuals as those who can correctly predict the magnitude of time-inconsistent
preferences).
129. See Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 99, at 222–23 (detailing a study finding
that a group of students with external deadlines performed better than a second group
who underappreciated the full extent of their propensity to procrastinate and, thus,
adopted sub-optimal deadlines); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to
Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 716–17 (2006) (finding that people are
overoptimistic about how much they will use a gym membership and then procrastinate
in canceling the membership).
130. This will occur whenever a partially naïve offender’s mispredictions lead her to
incorrectly believe that her short-run self will conclude that engaging in criminal
misconduct has negative expected returns. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 77, at
126–27, 141 (concluding that even small amounts of overoptimism can lead partially
naïve person to act in same manner as naïve one).
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by uncertainty.131 One important entry barrier is the fact that
committing a crime may undermine a person’s deeply held beliefs
about her moral integrity. However, once she becomes an
offender, many of these entry costs will disappear and cognitive
132
dissonance may lead her to rationalize her behavior ex post.
This means that a person who plans to commit just one crime
may nonetheless find it easier to commit others—for example, a
manager considering misstating financial results will want to
133
consider whether she is making a “[t]ransition into [c]rime”
that will be costly to reverse.
These entry and exit decisions will thus be affected by an
offender’s predictions of her future preferences, including her
present-biased preferences. For example, suppose that a person
is considering joining a gang and knows that joining will shorten
his life expectancy, and that it will be difficult for him to leave
the gang; difficult in that other gang members will generally
oppose his leaving and because he may become dependent on (or
134
otherwise accustomed to) a gang lifestyle. If in addition to
having this knowledge, he can correctly predict his future
preferences and willpower to leave the gang, he can make a
decision that takes into account how joining the gang will affect
his current and future well-being. The same is true for a person
deliberating about whether to try an illegal drug. If she is
correctly informed about the drug’s addictive quality, the
negative effects of repeated use (including out-of-pocket expenses
and intangible costs) and her future willpower to quit, she will
choose to start using the drug only if she believes that it is
135
intertemporally worthwhile.

131. For example, overoptimism about the potential for success plays an important
role in the decisions of entrepreneurs to market their products and form new businesses.
See Utset, supra note 17, at 100–04.
132. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering:
Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 647–48 (1997)
(explaining cognitive dissonance); Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to
Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879,
909 (2002) (citing lawyer greed as the principal catalyst for beginning to slide down the
“slippery slope” to misconduct); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 281–82 (2003) (discussing role of deception and cognitive
dissonance in self-perception).
133. See Darley, supra note 46, at 199 (describing white collar offenders who make
an “[u]nnoticed [t]ransition into [c]rime”).
134. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1319–21 (2003)
(describing social science work on group dynamics showing that, once individuals are part
of a group, they often act against their own self-interest, including subverting it in favor
of the group’s interest); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 1999) (prohibiting
participation in a criminal street gang).
135. See Gary S. Becker, Michael Grossman, & Kevin M. Murphy, Rational
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On the other hand, offenders with incorrect beliefs about
their future preferences may join gangs or try illegal drugs only
to find out later that their willpower to leave the gang or to
136
overcome a drug addiction was weaker than they had predicted.
Even when offenders have a long-term preference to cease their
137
criminal activity—to “fly straight” —they may repeatedly
procrastinate following through due to the immediate costs of
138
These include the costs of foregoing the immediate
exit.
benefits from crime, the time and effort necessary to get a job
(particularly if they have a criminal record or no real training, or
must overcome a drug or alcohol addiction), and those imposed by
their associates to prevent their exit.
A number of recent studies have found that timeinconsistent preferences can lead individuals to procrastinate
making analogous exit decisions even when the immediate costs
are much lower than in the above examples. One study measured
the effort expended by unemployed workers searching for new
139
jobs. Because search costs are immediate in nature, and the
benefits—finding and starting a new job—are delayed until
future periods, one would expect that individuals who give
greater weight to immediate gratification will exhibit lower levels
140
Using
of search intensity and remain unemployed longer.
141
various proxies of short-term impatience, the authors found

Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 237, 237 (1991)
(describing the model of rational addiction).
136. Cf. Teela Sanders, Becoming an Ex-Sex Worker: Making Transitions Out of a
Deviant Career, 2 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 74, 75–76 (2007) (describing studies finding
that women delay leaving the sex trade because of the immediate economic costs of
exiting, such as drug use and lack of an available alternative work).
137. See Morse, supra note 1, at 1607–08 (noting that rationality helps people “fly
straight” and obey the law).
138. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Addiction and Present-Biased
Preferences 1–3 (May 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Houston Law
Review) (setting forth a model of addiction where miscalculations of future self-control
problems can lead to addiction and cause someone to delay becoming unaddicted because
of the immediate costs of doing so); see also George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of
Addiction, in GETTING HOOKED: RATIONALITY AND ADDICTION 235, 236 (Jon Elster & OleJørgen Skog eds., 1999) (noting that visceral factors such as extreme hunger, thirst, pain,
anger, and sleepiness affect the preferences and actions of addicts).
139. See Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, Job Search and Impatience, 23
J. LABOR ECON. 527, 569 (2005).
140. Search intensity was measured by looking at the number of search methods
used by unemployed workers. Id. at 563.
141. The proxies used to measure impatience are similar to those used in other
studies. Individuals are deemed to have higher levels of impatience if they smoke,
consume a lot of alcohol, fail to use contraceptives, or do not have life insurance or bank
accounts. See id. at 547–51 (discussing variables and other studies using similar proxies
to measure impatience).
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that those with a higher level of impatience did, in fact, search
less.142
A second study looked at employees deciding whether to stay
in their current jobs and seek promotions, a process that requires
more time and patience (but potentially much higher rewards), or
to switch jobs in order to receive a more immediate increase in
143
Again, using standard proxies for short-term
salary.
impatience, the study found that those with higher levels of
144
impatience were more likely to switch jobs.
Finally, researchers studied single women with children and
their decisions on whether to work or participate in welfare
145
programs. The authors fitted the evidence to a model that
allowed for time-inconsistent preferences and concluded that the
data regarding the women’s decisions to delay exiting welfare
programs were best explained as reflecting time-inconsistent
behavior; in particular, that the women procrastinated finding
jobs because of immediate costs.
3. Serial Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: A Numerical
Example. Suppose that releasing pollutants into a stream is a
crime and that a hyperbolic offender with a short-term discount
factor of 0.7 has the opportunity to pollute everyday over a oneyear period. Each time that he pollutes he derives an immediate
benefit of $1,000, but triggers expected sanctions of $1,250.
Because the crime is not long-run worthwhile, the offender will
have a long-term preference to obey the law all 365 days. At the
same time, polluting is always short-run worthwhile, given that
$1,000/0.7 = $1429 > $1250.
A naïve offender will pollute all 365 days—each day
believing incorrectly that it will be the last time—and will incur
146
an aggregate welfare loss of $91,250. On the other hand, a
sophisticated offender will correctly predict his future presentbias premium and conclude that he will have a short-term
preference to pollute all 365 days. As a result, he will want to
142. See id. at 565 (finding that higher levels of impatience led to lower search
intensity). The study also found that the level of impatience was negatively correlated
with the exit rate from unemployment. Id. at 556.
143. See Francesco Drago, Career Consequences of Hyperbolic Time Preferences 1–3
(IZA Discussion Paper No. 2113, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=706281.
144. See id. at 25.
145. See Hanming Fang & Dan Silverman, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program
Participation: Evidence from the NLSY 1, Feb. 2006 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
The Houston Law Review).
146. The owner’s decision to pollute all 365 days exposed her to expected sanctions of
$456,250, and because her aggregate benefits from polluting equaled only $365,000, she
incurred net sanctions of $91,250.
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adopt a commitment device that will either increase the delayed
expected costs by at least $179 (to $1,429), or decrease the
immediate benefit from polluting from $1,000 to at least $875
(given that $875/0.7 = $1,250).
One possibility is for him to contract with a waste removal
company to dispose of the waste and, as part of the contract, have
a daily surcharge of $125, which would be paid immediately, but
refunded each day that the removal company’s services are used.
Note two things about this contract. First, as long as the offender
uses the waste removal company, he will not incur a loss from
147
the surcharge because it will be refunded. Second, in deciding
whether a waste disposal contract (or similar alternative) is
worthwhile, he will compare the cost of the contract with the
losses that he would incur due to his present-bias. As we will see
in Part IV, to effectively deter time-inconsistent offenders,
lawmakers must adopt penalty schemes that mirror the
commitment strategy of a sophisticated offender.
Finally, even a relatively small error in prediction can lead a
partially naïve offender down the path of repeated,
nonworthwhile misconduct. For example, a partially naïve
offender who mistakenly believes that his short-term discount
factor is 0.8 (or higher) instead of 0.7 will end up polluting all 365
days and incur a welfare loss equal to that of the naïve offender.
This is because each day he will predict incorrectly that on the
following day he will conclude that polluting is not short-run
worthwhile and choose to obey the law—given that $1000/0.8 =
$1,250, which equals the expected sanction. Because of this, he
will not adopt a commitment device.
H. Some Conclusions and Possible Objections
This Part has argued that if we extend the empirical
findings regarding time-inconsistency to the context of legal
misconduct, criminals may engage in repeated, nonworthwhile
misconduct notwithstanding a long-term preference to obey the
law. The phenomenon of time-inconsistent misconduct is a
counterintuitive result given the standard characterization of
criminal misconduct—that people who engage in repeated

147. This payment structure is not that different from deposit refunds used in
pollution contexts—e.g., surcharges and refunds on bottled drinks. Thus, some of those
payments can be seen as a sort of commitment device to get around self-control problems.
For a discussion of deposit-refund schemes, see Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway
Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
655, 735–36 (1990) (discussing the use of a deposit refund system—a surcharge—to
provide incentive to return polluting products).
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criminal activity must be doing so because they believe that the
expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Importantly, the
time-inconsistent misconduct model adopts the neoclassical
assumption that offenders will want to commit crimes only if the
benefits are greater than the expected sanctions. But ultimately,
148
wanting is not the same as doing. Moreover, as a general
matter, a hyperbolic offender will act in the same manner
predicted by the neoclassical model whenever committing a crime
is worthwhile from both a long-run and a short-run perspective.
Finally, whether or not offenders will actually engage in timeinconsistent misconduct will depend on the magnitude of their
preference for immediate gratification, their awareness of it, and
the availability of cost-effective commitment devices.
Let me set forth a caveat that should help foreclose possible
misunderstandings. This Article compares time-consistent and
hyperbolic offenders in order to contrast the conclusions of the
time-inconsistent misconduct model with those of the standard
law and economics model. I do not mean to imply that real
offenders always act in a time-inconsistent manner, or that all
criminal acts are due to time-inconsistent preferences.
Undoubtedly, a large portion of the illegal activity observed in
the real world is both long-run and short-run worthwhile;
however, given the evidence on time-inconsistency, it is safe to
assume that a subset of observed misconduct is due to the
present-bias of offenders. In short, to the extent that we want our
models to reflect the available evidence and make predictions
that track real-world behavior, the neoclassical model of criminal
misconduct is incomplete because it only captures timeconsistent criminal behavior.
Before leaving this Part of the Article, let me address a
couple of possible objections. One objection is that while it is
possible that people procrastinate and overconsume in many
facets of their lives, they are unlikely to do so in an area—
criminal misconduct—where the consequences are potentially
severe. However, as a general matter, the more important a
decision or the greater its potential consequences (gains as well
as losses), the more likely it is that a decisionmaker will
procrastinate because, all other things being equal, she will have

148. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 29–30
(1987) (defining “plans” as “mental states involving an appropriate . . . commitment to
action” and discussing the contingent, reversible nature of plans); JOHN R. SEARLE,
RATIONALITY IN ACTION 13–15 (2001) (discussing the assumption in the rational choice
model that there is no gap between the time a person makes a decision and the time she
follows through with the decision).
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to exert greater immediate effort in both physical and mental
exertion.149
For example, a person that spends years writing the (neverending) great American novel may have completed a series of
good short stories instead. An employee that has only one
investment option available to her—a money-market account—
may quickly enroll in a 401(k). If instead she has the ability to
choose from a menu of mutual funds, she may repeatedly delay
exerting the extra effort and procrastinate opening the 401(k).
This is the case even though the employee has the ability to
initially choose the money-market fund and later switch to other
150
mutual funds.
In the same manner, a serial offender who has determined
that continuing to commit crimes is not worthwhile must make a
series of important and complex decisions in order to exit. The
immediate costs of making these decisions—about alternative
sources of income, for example—can lead her to repeatedly
procrastinate following through with a worthwhile exit.
A second potential objection is that the model is not open to
easy empirical testing. This is actually the case with any model
of criminal misconduct given that offenders are unlikely to share
data regarding their behavior. However, the time-inconsistent
misconduct model builds on the overwhelming empirical evidence
that people routinely engage in time-inconsistent behavior, while
the standard model is based on an assumption—timeconsistency—that economists acknowledge does not reflect realworld discounting behavior. Moreover, the model isolates a
number of factors that will aid in empirical testing, including the
following three. First, time-inconsistent misconduct is more
likely in contexts in which offenders have the prospect of gaining
immediate benefits or avoiding immediate costs. Second,
hyperbolic offenders will react more pronouncedly than their
time-consistent counterparts to changes in these immediate
benefits and costs. Third, time-inconsistent misconduct is more
likely in contexts in which offenders have repeated opportunity to

149. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 77, at 141–42 (arguing that “people may
procrastinate more in pursuit of important goals than unimportant ones, or equivalently
that increasing importance can exacerbate procrastination”).
150. A number of studies have found that employees are likely to procrastinate
enrolling in retirement accounts due to the effort of choosing among investment options.
Some employers have tried to address this issue by providing default enrollment and
investment choice—e.g., a money-market account—in order to combat this type of
procrastination. See id. at 124 (arguing that employees are more likely to delay enrolling
in retirement accounts if provided with a menu of investment options).
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commit a crime and the incremental expected sanctions are
relatively small and bearable.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF TIME-INCONSISTENT MISCONDUCT:
THE PUZZLES OF NEOCLASSICAL THEORY REVISITED
Part II identified four puzzles of neoclassical theory—four
areas in which the theory’s predictions diverge from the observed
behavior of lawmakers and offenders. This Part uses the timeinconsistent misconduct theory to explain these puzzles. In doing
so, I show that the optimal sanctions of neoclassical theory will
underdeter hyperbolic offenders, set forth the types of policies
available to lawmakers to effectively deter hyperbolic offenders,
and develop a counterintuitive result that follows from the
model—the phenomenon of time-inconsistent obedience, which
can lead some offenders to repeatedly procrastinate committing
worthwhile crimes.
A. The Systematic Underdeterrence Puzzle and Hyperbolic
Offenders
The time-inconsistent misconduct model provides one
explanation for why lawmakers believe that some serial offenders
are systematically underdeterred by standard sanctions: all other
things being equal, the optimal sanctions of the neoclassical
model will underdeter hyperbolic offenders. Neoclassical and
hyperbolic offenders both have long-term preferences to commit a
crime if and only if it is long-run worthwhile—if from a long-term
perspective, the nondistorted benefits exceed the expected
sanction. However, a hyperbolic offender will sometimes commit
crimes that are short-run, but not long-run, worthwhile—
something an exponential offender would never do. In other
words, as a general matter, if a neoclassical offender commits a
151
crime, so will the hyperbolic offender; but in some instances,
the neoclassical offender will obey the law but the hyperbolic
offender will not.
More specifically, recall that under the neoclassical model
the optimal expected sanctions are equal to the expected harm
from misconduct. Then, continuing with the assumption that
δ =1, a hyperbolic offender engages in time-consistent misconduct
whenever the following holds:

151. There is one exception: if the immediate costs of committing a crime are
sufficiently high, hyperbolic offenders may procrastinate engaging in misconduct that is
worthwhile. See infra Part IV.F (developing the concept of time-inconsistent obedience).
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(benefits)/ β – (expected sanctions = harm) > (benefits) –
(expected sanctions = harm) > 0

Notice that this means that, whenever misconduct is both longrun and short-run worthwhile, a hyperbolic offender will see even
greater benefits in committing the crime than an exponential
offender, but in any case they will both engage in misconduct.
On the other hand, an exponential offender will obey the
law, but a hyperbolic offender will engage in time-inconsistent
misconduct whenever the following inequality holds:
(benefits)/ β – (expected sanctions = harm) > 0 ≥
(benefits) – (expected sanctions = harm)
As can be seen, the neoclassical sanctions will underdeter
hyperbolic offenders in cases in which exponential offenders are
optimally deterred. A hyperbolic offender is underdeterred by an
amount equal to (benefits)/ β – (benefits), which means that her
present-bias premium will be the maximum amount by which
she can be underdeterred.
This is an important result because this deterrence gap
produces welfare losses not only for those harmed by the timeinconsistent misconduct, but also for the hyperbolic offender who
has a long-term preference to obey the law and whose behavior
exposes her to expected sanctions that are higher than the
benefits that she receives. Moreover, a lawmaker who perceives a
deterrence gap but incorrectly assumes that offenders behave in
a time-consistent fashion will resort to increasing the expected
sanctions to close that gap. This will have two negative effects.
First, it will have the spillover effect of overdeterring offenders
with lower levels of present-bias. Second, as we will now see, all
other things being equal, it is generally more efficient to deter
hyperbolic offenders by reducing the immediate benefits of
misconduct, rather than by increasing delayed sanctions.
B. Well-Tailored Deterrence: Targeting Present-Bias of Offenders
In choosing between deterrence schemes, a lawmaker would
want to compare the direct and indirect social costs of alternative
mechanisms and choose the one that produces the most
152
deterrence at the lowest cost. To remedy the underdeterrence of
hyperbolic offenders, a lawmaker would first target their shortterm preferences.

152. See Sanchirico, supra note 22, at 1365 (stating that a cost-effective deterrence
mechanism incurs “low social costs per ‘unit’ of generated deterrence”).
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1. The Incentives Asymmetry: Increasing Delayed Sanctions
versus Reducing the Immediate Benefits from Misconduct. If a
lawmaker wanted to increase the deterrence of an exponential
offender, she can either increase the expected sanction or
decrease the immediate benefits from misconduct. In other
words, if we continue to assume that offenders do not have longterm impatience, then an exponential offender would perceive a
$1 increase in expected sanctions in the same manner as a $1
decrease in immediate benefits and would be equally deterred by
either method. However, because hyperbolic offenders give added
weight to immediate benefits of misconduct, all other things
being equal, reducing immediate benefits by $1 will increase
deterrence by a greater amount than increasing sanctions by the
same amount. Since β < 1, it will always be the case that:
(benefits) – $1/ β > (expected sanctions) + $1.
Suppose that hyperbolic John has a short-term discount
factor, β , of 0.7 and is contemplating committing a crime that
would give him an immediate benefit of $100 and trigger
expected sanctions of $100; and further assume that a crime is
not worthwhile if the benefits equal the expected sanctions.
Although the crime is not long-run worthwhile, it is short-run
worthwhile given that $100/0.7 = $142.86. To properly deter
John, a lawmaker can either increase the expected sanctions by
$42.86 (from $100 to $142.86), or reduce the immediate benefits
by a smaller amount, $30 (from $100 to $70, since $70/0.7 =
$100).
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that decreasing
immediate benefits always will be cheaper than increasing
expected sanctions. Moreover, a lawmaker will not have to
increase expected sanctions if she can make existing sanctions
more salient to hyperbolic offenders when they are considering
committing a crime. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
153
certification requirements make more salient—at the point in
time when a manager makes a securities filing—the costs she
would incur if she were to fail to comply with federal securities
laws.

153. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241) (addressing general certification requirements);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1350) (addressing certification for filings that include financial reports and
criminal sanctions for violating those certification requirements); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262)
(addressing management assessment of internal controls).
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2. Reducing Immediate Benefits from Misconduct.
Lawmakers can reduce the immediate benefits from misconduct
by adopting mechanisms that effectively (1) reduce an offender’s
access to a portion (or all) of the benefits, or (2) delay their
receipt by a sufficient amount of time so that they are no longer
received immediately. For example, financial institutions,
casinos, and other industries in which employees handle large
amounts of cash adopt internal controls to limit access to those
funds except by a small group of well-monitored employees; these
controls are sometimes required by regulators or are part of
154
internal auditing controls under accounting rules. One of the
rationales for segregation controls is to remove the “temptation
to steal” that comes from easy access. Such temptation would
only affect hyperbolic offenders. Easy access to funds would lead
time-consistent offenders to steal only if it results in a
sufficiently large reduction in the expected costs from stealing—if
easy access increased the probability that they would “get away
with it”—and not because it led to an increase in their
temptation because, by definition, time-consistent offenders
155
would not yield to temptation.
A second example is Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which,
among other things, prohibits a corporation from making
156
personal loans to managers and board members. This complete
bar on personal loans was adopted to deal with conflicts of
interest and the nontransparency of loans like the ones made to
157
officers of Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco. However, Section 402
also has a self-control component. Corporate loans increase the
liquidity of managers, making it easier for them to overconsume
(overextend themselves financially) outside of the corporation,
158
which in turn can affect their management decisions. In other
words, managers with easy access to corporate credit can

154. Note that incapacitation is one extreme way of reducing the immediate benefits
available to offenders, at least for any crime that they would be able to commit outside of
prison.
155. Under neoclassical deterrence, total segregation is optimal only if the benefits
exceed the costs—higher administrative costs—and if offenders would be equally deterred
by setting an expected fine that exceeds the expected benefits.
156. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat. 745, 787
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)) (addressing prohibition of personal loans to executives).
157. See Letter from Senators Susan M. Collins & Carl Levin to Harvey L. Pitt,
Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Sept. 25, 2002, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
release.cfm?id=209886 (describing loans made to executives in companies such as Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco).
158. For example, Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom owed the company $400 million,
which he had primarily borrowed to purchase WorldCom stock. Id.
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overconsume in the same manner as individuals who have easy
access to credit-card financing.159
3. Increasing Immediate Costs of Misconduct. Hyperbolic
offenders care both about delayed sanctions and the immediate
costs of committing crimes. Even if a hyperbolic offender gets an
immediate benefit from misconduct, she will not engage in timeinconsistent misconduct if she must incur immediate costs that
are sufficiently high to offset the added weight she gives to the
benefits.
For example, the gang loitering ordinances adopted in
Chicago allow the police to approach gang members (or other
groups of individuals who are “loitering”) and ask them to
160
As Tracey Meares has pointed out, one of the
disperse.
purposes of the ordinance is to increase drug dealers’ costs of
161
doing business. Drug dealers use “advertisers” to signal to
potential buyers from outside the neighborhood the locations
where they can purchase drugs; dispersal increases costs by,
among other things, requiring dealers to hire more
162
“advertisers.” However, the ordinance also increases immediate
search costs to recreational buyers. A hyperbolic buyer who has a
long-term preference to abstain from purchasing drugs but who
is motivated by the prospect for immediate gratification may be
sufficiently deterred by the added costs.
Another approach is to adopt gatekeeper schemes in which
gatekeepers not only engage in their usual gatekeeping activities,
but also police each other. The highly criticized Section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopts this type of cross-monitoring
procedure. It requires managers to make representations
regarding the company’s internal control procedures and requires
auditors to “attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
163
management of the issuer.” Managers and accounting firms, in

159. See George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model:
Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 48–49 (2001)
(comparing a simulated model of hyperbolic discounting households with empirical
evidence that households tend to hold low levels of liquid assets and engage in aggressive
credit card borrowing).
160. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV.
391, 410–12 (2000) (describing antiloitering ordinance and its role in dispersing gang
members and drug dealers by keeping them from the same location for at least three
hours after dispersal).
161. See id. at 412 (explaining the use of “advertisers” and the role of the ordinance
in increasing the cost of doing business).
162. Id.
163. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262) (addressing management assessment of internal controls).

(3)UTSET.DOC

2007]

9/12/2007 4:15 PM

HYPERBOLIC CRIMINALS

661

turn, hire lawyers to help prepare these attestations. It may well
be that critics are correct that Section 404 imposes high
compliance costs. However, the rule also increases the immediate
costs to managers and auditors of engaging in certain types of
illegal misconduct and, thus, helps deter managers and auditors
who may be motivated to act by their time-inconsistent
preference.
4. The Potential Costs of the Time-Inconsistent Approach. A
possible objection to the deterrence strategy set forth in this
section is that a lawmaker will need to have some knowledge of
the short-term discount factor of hyperbolic offenders and about
the magnitude of the immediate benefits and costs of criminal
misconduct. This is true. One advantage of the standard
approach—at least in theory—is that, in order to set the optimal
sanction, a lawmaker only needs to know the magnitude of the
expected harm. The lawmaker does not need to know the identity
of potential offenders, the benefits that they would receive, or
any other preferences that they may have. This “offenderneutral” approach is attractive, but it is not one that the more
nuanced versions of neoclassical theory adhere to or lawmakers
follow. For one thing, the neoclassical approach draws
distinctions between offenders with different levels of wealth,
risk aversion, and beliefs about the magnitude of sanctions and
probability of detection. And as we have seen, lawmakers
routinely take into account offender-specific factors, such as their
offense histories.
Even if neoclassical theory strictly adhered to the offenderneutral approach, there are at least two reasons why the
objection fails. First, in a quest for generality, the neoclassical
approach tells lawmakers to assume that their goal is to deter
exponential offenders. However, the evidence on timeinconsistency, described in Part III, exposes a number of
important shortcomings to this approach. Second, the additional
knowledge that lawmakers need to have to adopt optimal
sanctions under the time-inconsistent model is not as great as
may be first supposed. For example, for many types of crimes it is
quite easy to identify the extent to which offenders will receive
immediate benefits or incur immediate costs that would lead
them to engage in nibbling opportunism or procrastinate
complying with legal requirements. Additionally, the timeinconsistent misconduct model would be an improvement over
the standard model even if it were to prescribe that lawmakers
should use a single short-term discount factor for all offenders. In
other words, setting β = 0.9, or 0.8, for all offenders will be a
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better approximation of the present-bias of actual offenders than
assuming by fiat that none of them will give added weight to the
prospect of immediate gratification. Such an intermediate
approach would, at the very least, eliminate the current
underdeterrence of a subset of hyperbolic offenders. Of course,
settling on the right short-term discount factor will require
empirical investigation.
C. The Market for Commitment Devices and the Value of Default
Devices
When misconduct is observed by third parties, it can trigger
immediate informal sanctions that may, in certain cases, be
sufficient to offset a hyperbolic offender’s present-bias premium.
Of course, an offender who believes that the benefits from a
crime are much larger than the costs will not be dissuaded by
small, informal sanctions. One limitation of lawmakers’ reliance
on informal commitment is that they will tend to be very
sensitive to a hyperbolic offender’s level of wealth, social
connections, and educational and job prospects. Moreover, an
offender’s environment and relationships can sometimes have the
opposite effect. For example, some of the signs used by gangs and
drug dealers to advertise their wealth and profits from crime can
make more salient the immediate rewards of misconduct.
To the extent that commitment devices are valuable, one
would expect that a market would develop to provide costeffective commitment opportunities for sufficiently aware
offenders. A number of contractual provisions in insurance and
financial contracts can be characterized as commitment devices
of this sort—affirmative and negative covenants in indentures,
and provisions in officers and directors insurance excluding
coverage for certain types of misconduct, for example. The aim of
many of these provisions is to deter standard time-consistent
misconduct. Some of them, however, have a spillover effect,
helping deter hyperbolic offenders by increasing the immediate
costs of misconduct, reducing immediate benefits, or making
future sanctions more salient.
Nonetheless, there is an important obstacle to the
development of active markets for commitment contracts: an
offender’s offer to enter into such a contract will signal to the
other party (or the government) that they are contemplating
164
potential misconduct. To the extent that this signal creates a
164. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 300–01 (1991) (discussing
the problem of revealing information about one’s type in games with the government,
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cost greater than the benefits from foreclosing time-inconsistent
misconduct, offenders will forgo otherwise valuable commitment
opportunities.
Given some of the obstacles of developing markets for
commitment devices, lawmakers can increase social welfare by
providing off-the-rack default devices that can be used by
165
sufficiently sophisticated offenders. In other words, society can
provide Ulysses the rope and information about the Sirens
without necessarily taking a fully paternalistic approach and
tying him to the mast. As with default rules generally, these
state-provided devices can create value whenever a large number
of offenders face the same misconduct scenario and would each
166
have to develop their own commitment strategies. All other
things being equal, a sophisticated offender will be indifferent
between using her own device or one provided by society, because
she will opt out of it if she can commit at a lower cost.
However, if offenders are sufficiently naïve, they may decide
to opt out of default mechanisms. To the extent that lawmakers
have sufficient information about the short-term preferences of
these naïve offenders they may make some commitment devices
167
mandatory. Nonetheless, there is a simpler, less paternalistic
approach: using a default device, but making the immediate costs
of opting out sufficiently high to cause naïve offenders to
repeatedly procrastinate following through. Finally, another way
of reducing paternalistic concerns is for lawmakers to provide
commitment devices that have both default and mandatory
features. For example, the government provides tax incentives to
encourage sophisticated individuals to make contributions to
retirement accounts, as well as penalties to deter naïve ones from
making early withdrawals; both help hyperbolic individuals
168
overcome the temptation to overconsume early in life.
given the fact that the government cannot commit to abstain from renegotiating).
165. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 829–34 (1995) (discussing contractarian arguments regarding the way
courts should choose and design default rules).
166. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 96 (arguing that courts should fill gaps by
imagining what parties would have done if they had thought of the issue at the time of
contracting); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261, 261 (1985) (distinguishing between party-supplied terms and state-supplied gapfilling, implied terms).
167. Tax withholding is one such device, most colorfully summarized by E.B. White.
In complaining about its advent, he claims that the rule betrays a government with little
confidence in the citizenry: “[I]f left to your own devices, you will fritter away your worldly
goods and tax day will catch you without cash.” E.B. WHITE, THE SECOND TREE FROM THE
CORNER 123 (1954).
168. See David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, & Jeremy Tobacman, Self-Control and
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D. The Puzzle of Lawmakers Spending “Too Much” on
Enforcement Efforts
The discussion in the previous two sections helps explain
why lawmakers spend more on enforcement efforts than what is
predicted by neoclassical theory. Sanctions can be seen as the
back-end portion of deterrence (and they will always be delayed),
while enforcement activities are at the front-end, and thus are
more likely to impact the immediate benefits from crime.
Enforcement efforts include expenditures in prevention,
monitoring, and detection, which if well tailored can help reduce
an offender’s access to immediate benefits, increase the
immediate costs of engaging in misconduct, and in some
instances, act as off-the-rack commitment devices. Obviously, not
all enforcement expenditures will reduce immediate benefits—
merely increasing the probability of detection will not have the
desired effect unless the offender is detected immediately. But by
drawing this distinction between delayed sanctions and
enforcement expenditures, we can rationalize in part the
enforcement decisions of real-world lawmakers. Equally
important, this distinction helps focus attention on a variety of
approaches available to lawmakers to more effectively deter
hyperbolic offenders.
E. The Puzzle of Higher Sanctions for Repeat Offenders
The time-inconsistent misconduct theory provides a new and
simpler explanation for why previously-convicted offenders are
punished more severely. One way to remedy the underdeterrence
of hyperbolic offenders is to impose higher incremental sanctions
targeted at their short-term preferences. However, hyperbolic
offenders will have different short-term discount factors and, to
the extent that a lawmaker does not know the exact distribution
of offenders with different levels of present-bias, she can use
escalating sanctions to “price discriminate” between them. The
following is a highly stylized example that illustrates the general
intuition.
Suppose that there are four types of offenders: exponential
Mary ( β = 1); barely impatient Jack ( β = 0.9); impatient John
( β = 0.7); and very impatient Bob ( β = 0.5). They can each
commit a crime four times, which each time would give them an
immediate benefit of $100 and create a social harm of $100.
Saving for Retirement, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91, 96 (William C.
Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1998) (setting forth a hyperbolic model of
overconsumption in the context of saving for retirement).
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Assuming for purpose of exposition that there is a 100%
probability that the crime will be detected and that the offenders
will be punished, the optimal sanction is $100.
From the long-term perspective of period 0, all four offenders
will conclude that the crime is not long-run worthwhile
(assuming that the offenders obey the law if the benefits equal
the sanctions). Under the neoclassical approach the optimal
sanction will remain the same regardless of how many times an
offender commits a crime. As a result, in periods 1 through 4
exponential Mary will obey the law; however, the three
hyperbolic offenders will commit the crime all four times:
Jack: $100/0.9 = $111.11 > $100.
John: $100/0.7 = $142.86 > $100.
Bob: $100/0.5 = $200 > $100.
Suppose that a lawmaker adopts the following punishment
schedule:
No prior convictions: $100.
Once-convicted: $125.
Twice-convicted: $150.
Thrice-convicted: $200.
Mary never commits the crime and will not be affected by
the escalating sanctions. Given this penalty scheme, however,
Jack will only commit the crime in period 1, John in periods 1
and 2, and Bob in periods 1 through 3.
In more realistic scenarios, a lawmaker will want to trade off
potential under and overdeterrence produced by escalating
sanctions, which means that they would want to increase
sanctions in small increments. After a while they may want to
have a final large increase to weed out hyperbolic offenders with
very large self-control problems; instead of three-strikes regimes,
169
one with five or ten strikes would be better.
F. Time-Inconsistent Obedience and the Puzzle of Overly
Compliant Offenders
The final puzzle of the neoclassical approach is that people
obey the law more than they should: they routinely fail to engage
in misconduct notwithstanding the fact that the benefits are
170
This section
much higher than the expected sanctions.
169. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Incentives for Procrastinators, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 769, 771–72 (1999) (describing an incentive scheme for agents in which penalties
are increased incrementally to separate agents with different levels of time-inconsistent
preferences).
170. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 72 (discussing the low expected
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examines a counterintuitive result that follows when one allows
for hyperbolic offenders and which provides at least a partial
explanation for the puzzle. The intuition is straightforward:
many types of criminal activity require offenders to incur
immediate costs, costs which, if sufficiently great, can lead them
to repeatedly procrastinate committing crimes that are long-run
171
In other words, if the immediate costs are
worthwhile.
sufficiently great, a hyperbolic offender may repeatedly conclude
that following through with the planned misconduct is not shortrun worthwhile. Because these hyperbolic offenders have a longterm preference to engage in misconduct, I refer to their shortterm decisions to obey the law as time-inconsistent obedience.
When people consider committing crimes, they take into
account both the expected sanctions and a number of fixed costs
that they have to incur whether or not the crime is detected and
punished. Whenever a hyperbolic offender has to incur
immediate costs to commit a crime, she will determine that
misconduct is long-run worthwhile whenever the following
inequality holds:
(benefits) – [(immediate costs) + (expected sanctions)] > 0
However, she will conclude that misconduct is not short-run
worthwhile, whenever:
(benefits)/ β
– [(immediate costs/ β ) + (expected
sanctions)] ≤ 0
As a result, a hyperbolic offender will engage in timeinconsistent obedience whenever the following inequalities hold:
(benefits) – [(immediate costs) + (expected sanctions)] > 0 ≥
(benefits)/ β – [(immediate costs/ β ) + (expected sanctions)]
There are various types of immediate costs that can lead a
hyperbolic offender to engage in time-inconsistent obedience.
Offenders have to incur search costs to acquire information about
possible crimes and determine whether they are worthwhile. As
we saw in Part III, an offender’s decision to embark on a path of
serial misconduct can be very complex and can require taxing
deliberation efforts. Moreover, if the offender decides to commit
sanctions for tax violations and the fact that one would expect a greater level of
underpayment).
171. More specifically, offenders will make short-term decisions to procrastinate
following through with planned misconduct if the immediate costs (with the added
present-bias premium) are sufficiently great to override the (delayed) benefits of
misconduct. In more realistic situations, offenders will face both immediate benefits and
immediate costs and the immediate benefits are likely to predominate; that is, however,
not always the case—there are many regulatory and white-collar crimes that yield
delayed benefits.
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the crime, she would have to exert effort to follow through and
may experience the anxiety of being detected. She may also
experience the immediate disutility that often flows from moral
conflicts and an actor’s recognition that she has ethical
172
shortcomings. Even when moral strictures are not sufficient to
deter criminal activity, they can still create sufficiently large
internal moral discord to produce time-inconsistent obedience.
While some criminals are morally bankrupt, or at least moral
agnostics, one can plausibly assume that some offenders give
173
weight to moral norms, or at least deliberate in their shadow.
Committing a crime also requires an offender to expend
resources and exert effort to avoid detection, such as disposing of
incriminating evidence and taking other measures to cover her
174
tracks. The avoidance activity of a serial offender will require
greater planning and coordination—greater levels of deception,
anxiety, and greater effort keeping stories straight and
remembering who has been told what, and who may have
overheard, detected inconsistencies, or otherwise become
175
Finally, when crimes involve more than one
suspicious.
offender, the immediate costs of misconduct will increase, given
that offenders must coordinate their behavior and monitor each
other to assure that no one will opt for leniency in sanction over
176
loyalty to the group.
Finally, sophisticated hyperbolic offenders who want to
make sure that they follow through with their planned
(worthwhile) crimes may adopt commitment devices. This type of
commitment device is more common than may initially appear.
The mafia and certain gangs use formal initiation rites—killing
someone, for example—and other institutional strategies that act
177
These features of criminal
as commitment devices.
172. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 715, 728 (2000).
173. The cognitive dissonance literature attempts to explain how individuals may
change their internalized moral rules over time in order to make them comport more
closely with their acts of misconduct. Whether or not a person engages in this type of
moral arbitrage in response to their acts of misconduct, it is unlikely that a person can
completely turn off her moral compass. For an overview of the cognitive dissonance
literature, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 208–11 (2000).
174. See Sanchirico, supra note 22, at 1352–61 (discussing evidence on avoidance
investments by offenders).
175. See Manuel A. Utset, Towards A Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 540, 594–98 (1995) (arguing that the de facto requirement in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), that managers leave a paper trail, increases future costs of
changing stories).
176. See Katyal, supra note 134, at 1350–53 (describing monitoring costs within
conspiracies to prevent defections).
177. Having group members engage in murder is a particularly powerful

(3)UTSET.DOC

668

9/12/2007 4:15 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[44:3

organizations are usually explained as devices that group
members adopt to make sure that other group members do not
defect.178 However, hyperbolic offenders may also independently
value them as a way of committing to a path of worthwhile
misconduct.
V. OTHER CRIMINAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF TIME-INCONSISTENT
MISCONDUCT
A. Entry and Exit in Conspiracies
From an economic perspective, one of the puzzles of
substantive criminal law is why inchoate crimes such as
solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy are punished. These crimes
punish offenders even when their behavior has not created harm.
For example, a person who shoots to kill but misses may be
charged with attempted murder given that she has taken a
“substantial step” towards the commission of the underlying
179
crime. On the other hand, the crime of conspiracy only requires
180
that the co-conspirators have reached an agreement. Moreover,
while an offender may only be charged for an attempt or the
actual offense, co-conspirators can be charged and convicted for
being part of the conspiracy, as well as for any offense committed
by any of the conspirators. Finally, the law provides much
greater leeway for a single offender to abandon an attempt than
181
for a co-conspirator to withdraw from a conspiracy.
Why are conspiracies punished and why are co-conspirators
treated more harshly than someone charged with an attempt?
The short answer is that group misconduct poses a greater threat
182
to society than do the actions of lone criminals. The timeinconsistent misconduct theory helps explain some of the group

commitment device because there is no statute of limitations.
178. These entry rites can also increase a sense of group identity, which, as a result,
decreases the potential of defections. See Katyal, supra note 134, at 1355–58 (discussing
various ways to destabilize group identity to encourage defections from conspiracies).
179. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (2001) (providing that attempts are punished
where an offender’s actions constitute “a substantial step in a course of conduct planned
to culminate in his commission of the crime”).
180. This is the case in common law conspiracies; however, some conspiracy statutes
require some overt action toward the commission of the underlying crime. See, e.g., TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 15.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003) (“A person commits criminal conspiracy if,
with intent that a felony be committed . . . , he or one or more of them performs an overt
act in pursuance of the agreement.”).
181. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.4, at 308–11 (2001)
(discussing restrictions on withdrawing from conspiracies).
182. See Katyal, supra note 134, at 1322–23 (providing cognitive psychology
explanations for the dangerousness of conspiratorial groups).
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dynamics in conspiracies and the legal reactions to them. In
particular, it shows that forming conspiracies is more difficult
than traditionally thought; at the same time, the theory helps
explain the cohesiveness of conspiracies and why they are
punished separately.
1. Immediate Costs and Delays in Forming Conspiracies.
Conspiracies come into existence with an explicit or implicit
183
“agreement” between two or more individuals to carry out an
184
unlawful act (or a lawful act through unlawful means). Any
time that individuals, such as co-conspirators, come together to
form a group, they need to incur organizational costs that, if high
enough, can lead to collective action problems that prevent the
185
While these organizational costs are
group’s formation.
incurred immediately, the rewards to the members are
necessarily delayed, given that a group must first be formed
before a surplus can be produced and distributed. This means
that, even when each potential co-conspirator believes that
forming a conspiracy will provide her with positive expected
returns, if the immediate costs of agreeing to conspire are
sufficiently great, they each may have an incentive to
procrastinate following through. More generally, it follows that
overcoming collective action problems will be more difficult than
predicted by the standard account because, even when a
sufficient number of potential members are willing to contribute
186
to produce a public good, their present-bias can get in the way.

183. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975) (stating that the
agreement does not need to be explicit, but may be inferred from the surrounding facts
and circumstances of the particular conspiracy).
184. See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893) (defining conspiracy as
“a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means”).
185. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38–49 (1982) (examining the role of
group size in overcoming collective action problems); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION
OF INTERESTS 103–08 (1980) (discussing the role of “political entrepreneurs” in
overcoming collective action problems); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS, 44–47 (1965) (exemplifying the
classical treatment of group dynamics, which emphasizes the role of group size in
overcoming collective action problems).
186. Notice that in this case, the failure to “produce” a public good is not due to the
self-interested actions of free-riders or other transaction costs, but rather the to the
intrapersonal intertemporal conflicts of each potential group member. See Manuel A.
Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production Costs, and the
Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 287–95 (1995) (drawing a distinction between
transaction costs, which are interpersonal in nature, and production costs, which can be
either inter or intrapersonal and influence the activity of groups even when transaction
costs, as usually understood, are not a factor).
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This means, moreover, that policymakers can positively or
negatively affect the formation of groups by subsidizing or
increasing organizational costs.
In order to reach an “agreement,” potential co-conspirators
must incur a series of immediate organizational costs in time,
187
effort, and monetary outlays. Potential members must first
188
and then acquire and verify
search for co-conspirators
189
information about their skill sets and trustworthiness. They
must then delineate the group’s goals and identify the extent to
which their intentions intersect; in other words, they must make
190
some sense of their “shared intentions.” Finally, members must
also agree on how to divide tasks and allocate costs and
191
surpluses.
It follows that policymakers can exploit the present-bias of
potential co-conspirators by making them liable from the point
that they reach an agreement. This strategy increases the
immediate costs of organizing conspiracies, because potential
members may want to limit their interactions with each other
until they are sure that they would benefit from joining. This, in
187. See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete
Contracting: The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1358–68 (2003)
(arguing that time-inconsistent preferences can lead parties, at the time of bargaining
and entering into contracts, to procrastinate making their contracts sufficiently complete
and acquiring information about transactional hazards, including the skill and
trustworthiness of other parties, and about their own abilities).
188. These search costs are no different than those incurred by consumers (when
comparing products and merchants) and unemployed workers searching for employment.
See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 23–24 (1988) (discussing
costs of time spent by individuals searching for information); George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213–14 (1961) (discussing consumer
search decisions). On the interaction between search costs and procrastination, see
DellaVigna & Paserman, supra note 139, at 563–65 (finding that unemployed workers
with higher levels of present bias—impatience, for example—exhibit lower search
intensity due to immediate costs of looking for jobs).
189. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1803–07 (2001)
(discussing social science literature on self-selection by transacting parties and group
members along dimensions of trust and trustworthiness).
190. The concept of “shared intentions” developed by analytic philosophers can
valuably apply to the area of conspiracy law, as it helps clarify a number of difficult
questions regarding what it means to be a part of a group and the relationship between
interpersonal and intrapersonal coordination in groups. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
Shared Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY
110–13 (1999) (developing the theory of shared intentions that emphasizes the role of
such intentions in intra and interpersonal coordination, as well as in intragroup
bargaining and conflict resolution); JOHN R. SEARLE, Collective Intentions and Actions, in
CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE 90 (2002) (developing an account of collective intentions
that draws sharp distinction between individual and collective intentions).
191. See Utset, supra note 175, at 589–92 (describing how strategic behavior of firm
members when making distributional decisions can lead to bargaining breakdowns).
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turn, increases search and coordination costs and, concomitantly,
the potential that one or more co-conspirators may procrastinate
following through.
2. The Problem of Exit: Immediate Punishment and Group
Cohesiveness. We have already seen that, even when offenders
want to deviate from a path of criminal misconduct, they will
have an incentive to delay if the immediate costs of exit are
sufficiently high. One implication of this fact is that the
punishment needed for conspiracy leaders to keep members from
defecting, if immediate enough, will be lower than those
192
predicted by standard collusion models. In other words, the
punishment only has to be high enough to foster procrastination,
not necessarily to make the costs of exit greater than the benefits
from continuing in the conspiracy. The point is not that all
members who want to exit will procrastinate until the conspiracy
has completed its tasks, although some may; nor is it that
procrastination is the only reason members continue in the group
(for many, the benefits will exceed the costs). Instead, what the
time-inconsistent theory allows us to see is that members who
have concluded that they would be better off leaving the
conspiracy may nonetheless repeatedly procrastinate following
through. This is something that neoclassical offenders, at least in
theory, would never do. More generally, it follows that once
formed, hate groups, gangs, cartels, and criminal organizations
will be more cohesive than standard economic theory predicts.
As a result, a lawmaker who wants to cause group members
to defect will need to adopt policies that decrease the immediate
costs of exit, or alternatively, that increase its immediate
benefits—for example, witness protection, anonymous whistleblowing, monetary rewards for defectors, public praise, and
reductions in sentences.
B. Present-Bias and the Entrapment Defense
The police sometimes resort to undercover techniques that
induce or encourage people to commit crimes that they would
otherwise not commit (at least, not at that particular point in
time). While these techniques are useful for a variety of crimes
that are not susceptible to traditional enforcement procedures,
193
The
they increase the potential for police misconduct.
192. See Becker, supra note 15, at 205–07 (discussing the theory of criminal
collusion).
193. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441–45 (1932) (stating that
“[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed” by police because they are often necessary “to
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entrapment defense has been developed in part to constrain the
ability of the police to overstep the boundary between detecting
crime and encouraging criminal misconduct.
Under the Model Penal Code, the defense is available when
the police employ “methods of persuasion or inducement that
create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed
194
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.”
Although there are no hard-and-fast rules, strategies such as
“appeals to sympathy or friendship, offers of inordinate gain, or
persistent offers to overcome hesitancy” may be deemed
195
The
inappropriate inducement, depending on the context.
entrapment defense makes economic sense: the goal of deterrence
is to deter offenders who planned to commit crimes that would
harm third parties, not to use enforcement resources to stimulate
196
unplanned criminal activity.
Justice Frankfurter provides another justification for the
entrapment defense: “Human nature is weak enough and
sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding to
197
them and generating crime.” The time-inconsistent misconduct
theory gives further insight into how the police can tempt people
to engage in crime that they would not have otherwise committed
and, thus, has implications for the scope of the defense. Even
relatively small, immediate inducements can be enough to cause
an offender to make a short-term decision to commit a
nonworthwhile crime. Moreover, the problem is not just that the
police may tempt offenders with immediate benefits: reducing
immediate costs would have the same result. For example, the
exception to the entrapment defense for situations where police
officers “merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
198
commission of the offense” is untenable under the theory, at
least when an opportunity sufficiently reduces immediate costs to
trigger misconduct.

reveal the criminal design,” but not “when the criminal design originates with the officials
of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense”).
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (2001).
195. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS §9.8(c) (2d ed. 2003).
196. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 564–65 (arguing that individuals who had not
intended to commit crimes do not need to be deterred).
197. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
198. Sorrells, 287 U.S at 441.
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C. Domestic Violence and Time-Inconsistent Exits
199

Domestic violence is a leading cause of injury to women. A
common domestic violence scenario is the following: a woman is
abused by her husband in repeated, albeit intermittent, fashion
over a long period. The abuse occurs in cycles in which a period of
200
abuse is followed by a period of nonabusive interactions.
Finally, it may be physical or psychological, and may be directed
at both the woman and children.
Abusers are motivated by a variety of reasons, including a
201
desire to exercise power and control over their victims, but
regardless of the underlying motive, engaging in abuse is likely
to provide them with immediate benefits. At the same time, not
all abusers will have a long-term preference to harm their
victims; in fact, under the cycle-of-abuse scenario, abusers
alternate between periods of harmful and nonharmful (or more
likely, less-harmful) behavior. It follows that those who have a
long-term preference to abstain from abuse and are sufficiently
aware of their self-control problems would want to adopt
commitment devices to prevent themselves from engaging in
future abuse.
In a recent article, Jeannie Suk describes the growing use of
protection
orders
and
misdemeanor
domestic-violence
prosecutions as part of a concerted effort to criminalize an
202
abuser’s presence in the home and, in essence, effect state203
imposed “de facto divorces.” Because the home is the place
where abusers can experience the immediate benefits from
204
abuse, such a ban takes away the locus of temptation. In any
type of relationship, the immediate costs associated with
bringing it to an end can lead even loving, but disillusioned,
partners to repeatedly procrastinate going their separate ways.
The immediate costs of exit for abusers include losing the abusive
and nonabusive benefits from the relationship, as well as the
199. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1991).
200. See Judith Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate
Battery and Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 617, 671 (2006) (describing the three stages
of abuse).
201. See Mahoney, supra note 199, at 5 (recognizing that “batterer’s quest for control
of the woman” is central to the “battering process” (emphasis omitted)).
202. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 21 (2006)
(stating that by excluding abusers from the home, “the protection order identifies the
home itself as a dangerous place”).
203. Id. at 42 (describing the use of criminal courts to “end intimate relationships”).
204. For example, Suk notes that “[b]anning the abuser’s presence seems a logical
way of attempting to make the home free of fear.” Id. at 21.
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effort and other costs of finding a new place to live. A stateimposed “de facto divorce” acts as a sort of deadline to end delays
in exiting from the cycle of abuse.
For battered partners, the immediate costs of exit are even
higher. Therefore, women who have made long-term decisions to
leave their abusers may also repeatedly delay ending the
relationship. Even a woman who has begun the process may
change her mind once the abuse has subsided and the immediate
benefits from exit are not as salient.
Moreover, an abuser can cause a battered partner to stay in
the relationship longer than she otherwise wanted by increasing
the immediate costs of leaving. For example, an abuser can
threaten to withhold economic support, evict the partner, take
children away, and, of course, to inflict violence. For the same
reason as in conspiracies, the punishment (actual or threatened)
necessary to keep a partner in an abusive relationship is lower
than that required under the standard account; it definitely does
not require threats of violence. The state-imposed divorce
described by Suk helps reduce some of these immediate costs of
leaving abusers and thus has policy implications that would
otherwise remain obscure if one were to adopt the standard timeconsistency assumption.
Similarly, the time-inconsistent misconduct theory sheds
new light on the “transition role” played by battered-women
shelters. Shelters of course protect women from the violence that
may follow their announcement to leave an abusive relationship;
however, they also reduce the immediate costs of exit and, thus,
the incentive to procrastinate affecting a final severance. In other
words, women who believe that the benefits of staying with their
abusers exceed the costs are unlikely to change their minds
merely because of temporary reduction in costs that shelters
provide.
D. Obstacles to Time-Inconsistent Explanations of Criminal
Misconduct
Before concluding, we must address some of the reasons
why, notwithstanding the criminology evidence on self-control
problems of recidivists, criminal law scholars and policymakers
have, as a general matter, resisted giving too much weight to the
role played by self-control in an offender’s decision to violate the
law. One reason is that notions of criminal responsibility
developed against the background conception of moral
responsibility that, from Plato and Aristotle onward, equated
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weakness of will with moral failing,205 and characterized personal
autonomy and the ability to act upon one’s will as the paradigm
206
of the rational moral actor.
A second reason is that neoclassical theory is based on the
premise that offenders are instrumentally rational: if a person is
observed violating the law, claims that she really wanted to do
otherwise will be met with skepticism, given that rational actors
(at least in theory) do not systematically override their
207
preferences in response to transient temptations. Related to
this is the claim that paternalistic “interferences” with a person’s
self-control problems undermine their autonomy as a rational
208
Therefore, even when self-control problems are
actor.
acknowledged, the cure (paternalistic intervention) is often
deemed costlier than the problem. As I have argued, however, in
many instances, it is possible to address self-control problems
with minimal state intervention—for example, by providing
205. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 1811 (stating that “[w]e must consider first,
then, whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly”);
PLATO, PROTAGORAS, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 308, 338 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1989) (stating that “no wise man believes anyone
sins willingly or willingly perpetrates any evil or base act. They know very well that all
evil or base action is involuntary.”); see also J.L. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 198 n.1 (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that it is an error to equate
weakness of will with moral weakness and stating that this “confusion” of collapsing
“succumbing to temptation” into losing control is one handed down by Plato and
Aristotle).
206. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 114 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785) (stating that “a free will and a will under moral
laws are one and the same”).
207. Under rational choice theory, rational actors have preferences that are stable
over time. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 19–22 (1990)
(providing that the general economic model assumes that actors have preferences that are
transitive and stable over time).
208. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994)
(arguing battered woman syndrome reinforces “invidious understanding of women’s
incapacity for rational self-control”); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 794 n.94 (1983) (arguing that persons who lack the “quality
of critical reflectiveness may also be said to lack self-control and even autonomy”). Justice
Holmes’s concurring opinion in United States v. Reynolds, the case striking down the
Alabama law allowing individuals to enter into service contracts backed by the threat of
imprisonment, provides a standard example of such a paternalistic argument:
[I]mpulsive people with little intelligence or foresight may be expected to lay
hold of anything that affords a relief from present pain even though it will cause
greater trouble by and by. The successive contracts, each for a longer term than
the last, are the inevitable, and must be taken to have been the contemplated
outcome of the Alabama laws [being struck down].
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914). Nonetheless, as can be seen, Justice
Holmes’s general insight on the self-harm created by repeatedly yielding to immediate
gratification is in the same spirit as the arguments advanced in this Article. The
difference is that, as I have argued, intelligence has little to do with the problem; in the
end, awareness is the key.

(3)UTSET.DOC

676

9/12/2007 4:15 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[44:3

default commitment devices, which are analogous to the default
rules used in many areas of the law.
A third concern is that strategic offenders will try to avoid
209
responsibility by making self-control excuses. The argument
continues that, if self-control problems are as ubiquitous as the
evidence indicates, it will be difficult for judges to make
meaningful, nonarbitrary distinctions between weak-willed
offenders who can plead leniency or a bona fide excuse and those
who deserve harsher treatment for failing to address their self210
control problems.
It may be that some of these reasons for ignoring the selfcontrol problems of offenders are persuasive, but only, I would
grant, when they are being used to question the imposition of
legal responsibility. When the concern is deterrence the matter is
different. In fact, it is this type of deliberate self-control problem
that is most likely to be amenable to changes in deterrence
policy, or at least that is what this Article has tried to
demonstrate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time-inconsistent misconduct theory developed in this
Article is a relatively straightforward and intuitive explanation
for the underdeterrence problem described in Part II. The theory
starts with the same basic motivational premise as neoclassical
theory: from a long-term perspective, rational criminals want to
commit only economically worthwhile crimes; unlike the

209. A true weak-willed offender has to be able to credibly communicate or signal to
judges that they are in fact weak-willed. To achieve this, they have to be able to send
signals that cannot be mimicked by strong-willed offenders. This creates a standard
“market for lemons” adverse selection problem. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for
‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970)
(discussing the adverse selection principle in an insurance context).
210. This problem is captured by the following quotation from a judge considering a
downward departure in a convict’s sentence:
[M]any of the offenders that we see commit what we would consider almost
irrational crimes. They’re impulsive, they have difficulty controlling their
impulses, and they exercise poor judgment. That’s a characteristic of their
lives. . . . I think that what [the Guideline’s drafters are] getting at is something
less than the old definition of insanity but something that is out of the ordinary,
something that is—I won’t say “unique,” but at least is rare, separating people
that would fall within this guideline from the large category of defendants that
we see who repeatedly commit crimes . . . .
United States v. Gulley, 29 F. App’x 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2002). This judge’s concern with being able
to draw proper boundaries is captured more picturesquely by the futile results of the mapmaker
in the Borges story who was asked to produce as precise a map as possible and wound up
producing a map of the size of the kingdom. See JORGE LUIS BORGES & ADOLFO BIOY CASARES,
EXTRAORDINARY TALES 123 (Anthony Kerrigan ed. & trans., Herder and Herder 1971).
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neoclassical approach, it allows for almost-rational (but more
realistically rendered) criminals who may yield to the pull of the
immediate benefits from misconduct. One important result is
showing that the deterrence prescriptions of neoclassical
deterrence will, all other things being equal, underdeter
hyperbolic offenders. In order to efficiently deter hyperbolic
offenders, a lawmaker must directly target their short-term
preferences.
A second objective of the Article has been to isolate the
factors that affect a hyperbolic offender’s decision to engage in
repeated misconduct. While it is an offender’s present-bias that
leads her to commit nonworthwhile crimes, it is her awareness of
her future self-control problems and the availability of
commitment devices that will ultimately determine whether she
engages in occasional or repeated misconduct. Therefore, a
principal contribution of the time-inconsistent misconduct theory
is to show that a lawmaker can provide cost-effective deterrence
by mimicking the commitment devices that sophisticated
offenders would adopt for themselves.
The neoclassical approach rules out, by fiat, the potential
that offenders will engage in time-inconsistent misconduct. On
the other hand, the Article’s theory incorporates all of the insight
of neoclassical theory for any offender who has no preference for
immediate gratification—who has time-consistent preferences. It
also provides a new way of thinking about the behavior of all
other offenders. Even if it could be empirically verified that
almost all criminals have no preference for immediate
gratification, the time-inconsistent misconduct theory would still
help policymakers design deterrence schemes to effectively deter
the remaining offenders.
However, the evidence described in Part III, as well as the
criminology self-control literature, would make one suspect that
the opposite, positive claim is closer to the truth: that many
criminals have time-inconsistent preferences and that, assuming
that they do not can make them and any time-consistent
offenders worse off; the indiscriminate ratcheting-up of criminal
sanctions described in Part II.C is but one example.

